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DECEPTIVE SALES PRACTICES AND
FORM CONTRACTS-DOES THE CONSUMER
HAVE A PRIVATE REMEDY?
Stephen L. Hester*
We cannot be surprised that lawlessness breeds lawlessness. The
subtle, sophisticated lawlessness of many slum merchants
breeds the violent lawlessness of their victims. [Statement by
Earl Johnson, Jr., Director, Legal Services Program, OEO, before the NationalAdvisory Commission on Civil Disorders.

and
A ll consumers occasionally encounter deceptive, misleadingpres-

even fraudulent practices on the part of merchants and high
sure salesmen. There is evidence that these practices are most commonly encountered by low income consumers who lack the education
or sophistication needed to protect themselves,' and the President's
Commission on Civil Disorders found that the ill will and frustration engendered by unconscionable practices has been a contributing
cause of riots in the poverty areas of American cities.2
Most commentators on the consumer problems of the
unsophisticated buyer have felt that present law is inadequate to
remedy existing abuses and have called for new legislation.' Professor
Caplovitz, who studied the consumer problems of low income
residents of the upper and lower East Side in Manhattan, came to the
* A.B. 1958, Duke University; LL.B. 1965, Harvard University; Visiting Assistant Professor of Law, Duke University, 1967-68.
' PRESIDENT'S COMMITTEE ON CONSUMER INTEREST, THE MOST FOR THEIR MONEY 7 (1965);
Hearingson H.R. 7179 Before the Subcomm. of the House Comm. on Government Operations,
89th Cong., 2d Sess. (1965); Baum, The Consumer and the Federal Trade Commission, 44 J.
URBAN L. 71 (1966).
2

See REPORT OF THE NATIONAL ADVISORY COMMISSION ON CIVIL DISORDERS 4, 81-82, 139-

40 (1968).
1E.g., CAPLOVITZ, THE POOR PAY MORE (1963)

[hereinafter cited as CAPLOVITZ]; W.
(1968); Comment, Translating

MAGNUSON & J. CARPER, THE DARK SIDE OF THE MARKETPLACE

DUKE LA W JOURNAL

[Vol. 1968: 831

conclusion that existing law discriminated against the low income
consumers he interviewed:
The legal structure is based on a model of the "sophisticated"
consumer, not that of the "traditional" consumer prevalent among
low income families. It assumes, for example, that the consumer
understands the conditions to which he is agreeing when he affixes his
signature to an installment contract. But we have seen time and again,
that this assumption does not hold for many of these consumers.
The present legal system thus falls short of its goals because its image
of the low income consumer is not correct. As a result, it unwittingly
favors the interest of the merchant over those of the consumer by
permitting deviant practices, which take advantage of the consumer's
ignorance.4
New legislation may be necessary fully to redress the imbalance in
our legal system that "favors the interests of the merchant over those
of the consumer." For the present, lawyers need to be aware of the
possibility of protecting the defrauded consumer under the existing
legal rules. The present article explores this possibility in a number
of typical cases of deceptive sales practices. The cases considered involve disputes between merchants and consumers and do not involve
the additional problems faced by a consumer who has signed a negotiable instrument which the merchant has sold to a bank or finance
company.'
The practical assertion of legal rights by defrauded consumers
will depend in most cases upon the availability of professional legal
advice and assistance. So long as legal services are unavailable to
low income- consumers, the existence of legal remedies may be of
little importance to them. However, expanded programs of legal aid,
such as the Legal Services Program of the Office of Economic OpSympathy for Deceived Consumers into Effective Programs for Protection, 114 U. PA. L. REv.
395 (1965); Comment, Consumer Legislation and the Poor, 76 YALE L.J. 745 (1967); Note,
Installment Sales: Plight of the Low Income Buyer, 2 COLUM. J.L. &Soc. PRoD. 1 (1966).
' CAPLOVITZ at 188-89.
The law of some states already severely restricts the availability of the holder in due course
defense where a merchant deals on a regular basis with a particular financing agency. E.g.,
Unico v. Owen, 232 A.2d 405 (N.J. 1967). A few states have enacted legislation restricting the
availability of the holder in due course defense in the consumer area. See, e.g., 69 PA. STAT. tit.,
69, § 615(g) 1963. A provision is included in the Uniform Consumer Credit Code which would
make it unlawful for the seller to take a negotiable instrument in a consumer credit sale.
UNIFORM CONSUMER CREDIT CODE § 2.403. For a recent discussion of the holder in due course
defense, see Littlefield, Good Faith Purchase of Consumer Paper, 39 S. CAL. L. REV. 48

(1966).
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portunity, may make legal advice increasingly available to low income groups. In addition, the growth of group legal services programs provided through organizations such as labor unions may also
contribute to the availability of legal advice to these low income
groups.6
This study will proceed by separately considering the possibility of
legal remedy afforded to consumers by each of the following bodies of
law: first, the contract law of rescission; second, the contract law of
warranty; third, the tort law of fraud and deceit, and the new tort
theory of strict liability; fourth, the rules relating to estoppel and illegal bargains; and finally, section 2-302 of the Uniform Commercial Code, which allows the -court to refuse to enforce "unconscionable" contracts or clauses. Throughout the following discussion,
reference will be made to five typical sales schemes described below.
TYPICAL CASES

A brief perusal of the proceedings noted in paragraph 7500 and
following of the CCH Trade Regulation Reporter reveals a
bewildering variety of deceptive sales practices. The situations
discussed herein are not representative of all the various types of fraud
and misrepresentation in the market place and are presented here only
for purposes of illustration. However, these cases do depict common
situations, and are drawn from the actual facts of FTC proceedings,
reported cases, studies such as that by Caplovitz, and personal
interviews.
Case 1. Fear Sale Schemes. A salesman calls on Mr. and Mrs.
Adams and falsely claims that he is from the Housing Authority. He
informs them that they must buy a certain attachment for the sinks in
their apartment or they will be expelled from public housing. This is
completely untrue. They sign an installment contract purchasing the
attachments.7
Case 2. Rejerral-Sales Schemes. A salesman calls on Mr.
Basset and offers to let him in on a "money-making" plan. If Basset
will sign a contract to buy a new refrigerator, he can earn money by
referring names to the company. The salesman says Basset will earn
$50.00 for every person referred by him who "enrolls in the plan," and
says that six or seven out of every ten persons referred will decide to
' See UMW v. Illinois State Bar Ass'n, 389 U.S.

217 (1967).
'See CAPLOVITZ at 61; Comment, Consumer Legislation and the Poor, 76 YALE L.J. 745,
759 n.84 (1967).
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enroll. Basset is told the sales contract is merely a formality since he
will have no trouble earning more in referral commissions than the
small amount of the monthly payments and, consequently, he will
never have to pay anything out of his own pocket for the refrigerator.
Basset signs the contract, but finds he is unable to earn any referral
commissions8 and, therefore, cannot make the payments.
Mr. Coley purchases a

suite of furniture on the installment plan for $900 plus interest. The
salesman stressed to Coley the low payments and lauded the quality of
the furniture, telling him that it was the best on the market, that it
would never wear out, and that he would be much better off in the long
run buying high quality furniture rather than some of the cheaper
furniture that might be available. The salesman also said the furniture
was solid maple. In fact, the furniture Coley bought was very low
quality and made of plywood with a veneer of maple. It normally
retailed for $400, and it quickly became very worn and shoddy under
normal use.9
A salesman calls

on Mrs. Daley and demonstrates a new sewing machine. She is
doubtful about whether she needs the machine, but the salesman urges
her to purchase it, telling her that the contract allows her to return
the machine and pay nothing if she changes her mind within thirty
days. He also tells her that there is a five-year warranty on the sewing machine. In fact the contract provides that it cannot be cancelled and that the warranty is limited to ninety days. Mrs. Daley signs
the contract without reading it and receives the machine. 0
5.

A salesman calls on Mr. and

Mrs. Ely and tells them that they are a specially selected
demonstration family for a new encyclopedia. Because'of this, they
are entitled to receive a new encyclopedia absolutely free if they will
agree to tell their neighbors about it. However, to show that they have
a genuine interest in the product, they must agree to purchase
supplements to the encyclopedia for ten years at the actual cost to the
company. The salesman says the entire set is worth $989, but they will
only have to pay the nominal cost of the revision service. The Elys are
induced to sign a contract which calls for payments of approximately
3E.g.,

State v. ITM, Inc., 52 Misc. 2d 39, 275 N.Y.S.2d 303 (Sup. Ct. 1966); Sherwood &

Roberts-Yakima, Inc. v. Leach, 67 Wash.2d 630,409 P.2d 160 (1966).
' See CAPLOVrrZ at 18-19,81-93. See generally 2 TRADE REG. REP. T 7619 at 12,338 (1965).
"0State v. ITM, Inc.. 52 Misc. 2d 39, 275 N.Y.S.2d 303 (Sup. Ct. 1966). See generally
TRADE REG. REP. 7845 at 12,605.
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$400 over a three year period, plus finance charges. In return they will
receive an encyclopedia and the revision service for ten years. Mr. and
Mrs. Ely are not in fact specially selected and the contract price is
actually the normal retail price of the encyclopedia and the revision
service."
In each of the above cases the contract which is signed by the
buyer contains an integration clause stating: "This written agreement
contains the entire contract between the parties; there are no
representations, warranties, promises, or conditions of any kind not
contained in this written agreement, and no such representations,
warranties, promises or conditions were made to buyer by way of
inducement or otherwise." The contract also contains a warranty
disclaimer clause giving a limited warranty for a short period, but
stating that there is no other warranty or liability of any kind, and
that the limited warranty given is expressly in lieu of the warranty of
merchantability and of fitness for a particular purpose. This language
is conspicuous so as to comply with requirements of section 2-316 of
the Uniform Commercial Code.
Each of the hypothetical cases set forth above involves deceptive
trade practices which are unlawful under section 5 of the Federal
Trade Commission Act if they are "in commerce."' 2 These practices
may also be unlawful under various state statutes, 3 but such statutes
do not provide a private remedy for the consumer.
CONTRACT LAW-RESCISSION

All of the above cases involve some form of misrepresentation on
the part of the seller or his agent. In general, misrepresentation is a
ground for rescission of a written contract if the misrepresentation is
4
either intentional or innocent and material.
Rescission will often provide a more satisfactory remedy to low
income consumers than recovery of damages since rescission directly
"See, e.g., Basic Books, Inc. v. FTC, 276 F.2d 718 (7th Cir. 1960); California v. P.F. Collier,

Inc., Civil No. 894, 934 (L.A. County Super. Ct. 1967).
12 15 U.S.C. § 46 (1964). See generally G. ALEXANDER, HONESTY AND COMPETITION (1967);
W. MAGNUSON & J. CARPER, note 3 supra, 3-31; Millstein, The Federal Trade Commission and
False Advertising, 64 COLUm. L. REv. 439 (1964); Weston, Deceptive Advertising and the
FederalTradeCommission Decline of Caveat Emptor, 24 FED. B.J. 548 (1964).
"See UNIFORM DECEPTIVE TRADE PRACTICES ACT §§ 2(a)(6), (7), (9), (11), (12); Dole,
Merchantand ConsumerProtection: Uniform Deceptive TradePracticesAct, 76 YALE L.J. 485
(1967); Developments in the Law-Deceptive Advertising, 80 HARV. L. REV. 1005, 1119-39
(1967).
" RESTATEMENT OF CONTRACTS § 476(1) (1932); RESTATEMENT OF RESTITUTION §§ 8, 28, 55

(1936).
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bars enforcement of the contract and allows the consumer to avoid
paying what is often a very high purchase price. Often consumers will
not seek legal assistance until their wages are garnisheed or they are
faced with legal proceedings to enforce payment.'5 For instance, in
case 4 Mrs. Daley may not seek help until after the seller has already
repossessed the sewing machine and is attempting to collect the
remaining balance of the price by taking away Mrs. Daley's
furniture. 6 At this point a judgment for damages against the seller
often will not relieve the buyer's immediate distress as effectively as
rescission and restitution. 7 The buyer's path to rescission may be
barred, however, by one or more of the legal obstacles discussed
below.
A.

The ParolEvidence Rule

In theory the parol evidence rule does not bar the introduction of
oral evidence which shows fraud or material misrepresentation, since
the effect of such evidence is not to vary or contradict the terms of a
valid written instrument, but to show the invalidity of the
instrument.'8 For example, the reluctant buyer of the sewing machine
in case 4 believed the written contract contained terms providing a
five-year warranty and permitting return of the merchandise without obligation within thirty days. The salesman knew of this belief
and, whether or not he knew it was erroneous, he had no reason to
suppose that the buyer actually assented to the different terms of the
written instrument she signed. Since there was no effective assent on
the part of the buyer, a valid written contract was never created and
the parol evidence rule should not apply. The buyer should be entitled to either rescission or reformation, regardless of whether the
salesman was aware of the actual terms of the written instrument.
Similarly, if a buyer's assent to the contract is induced by fraud or a
"1ATLANTA COMMISSION ON CRIME AND JUVENILE DELINQUENCY, OPPORTUNITY FOR URBAN

77 (1966); see CAPLOVITZ at 177-78.
"See Williams v. Walker-Thomas Furniture Co., 350 F.2d 445 (D.C. Cir. 1965).
"Of course, if substantial damages can be obtained, this may be offset against the seller's
claim, or used as a bargaining weapon by buyer's attorney.
"13 A. CORBIN, CONTRACTS § 573 (1960) [hereinafter cited as CORBIN]; RESTATEMENT OF
EXCELLENCE

CONTRACTS § 238 (1932); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 260, comment d (1958). But
see 9 J. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 2439 (3d ed. 1940) (interprets the parol evidence rule as barring

rescission for material and innocent misrepresentation in some cases where rescission would be
permitted for fraud) [hereinafter cited as WIGMORE].
" CORBIN, §§ 577 & 582; RESTATEMENT (SECOND)
OF CONTRACTS

§ 491.

OF AGENCY

§ 259A (1958);

RESTATEMENT
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material misrepresentation, such as the false claim of public authority in case 1,the parol evidence rule does not prevent the buyer from
showing these facts and withdrawing his assent. This view of the parol evidence rule is reflected by section 2-202 of the UCC, which
gives effect to the rule only in cases where the writing was "intended
by the parties as a final expression of their agreement." 20' This puts
to the court the question of whether the writing was in fact so intended, and to answer this question the court must look outside the recitals of the writing.
The case law is less clear than the above theory indicates,
particularly in cases where the written instrument contains a so-called
"integration clause" providing that there are no representations,
warranties, or promises not contained in the written instrument.2 '
Some courts still take the view that if the buyer signs a paper stating
that there were no representations made by the salesman, the buyer
cannot later prove that representations were made.
Nearly forty years ago a study of the effect of integration clauses
in North Carolina found the following:
The large manufacturer distributor selling to the small consumer
usually has as one of the terms of the written contract of sale a
stipulation that it contains the entire agreement of the parties, and
that no representations or warranties of the agent shall be binding on
the company unless included in the writing. The written provisions
seem always to control. A realistic view of the situation of the parties
might conduce to the opposite conclusion. * * * The court might
take the view that this was patently a tribute of the weak to the
strong, that both parties knew that the written provision did not express the buyer's real intention; and that consequently it was of no
effect. Suffice it to say that this view has not been taken, though a
perusal of these cases leads to the conclusion that often it would have
worked more substantial justice than the legalistic view of the trans22
action.
The results of these old North Carolina cases are consistent with
recent cases in many states if the buyer brings suit for breach of
20

But see Green Chevrolet v. Kemp, 241 Ark. 62,406 S.W.2d 142 (1966).

21See, e.g., Note, Warranties,Disclaimers and the Parol Evidence Rule, 53 COLUM. L. REv.

858 (1953); Note, Disclaimersof Warrantyin ConsumerSales, 77 HARV. L. REV. 318 (1965).
22Chadbourne & McCormick, The Parol Evidence Rule in North Carolina,9 N.C.L. REv.
151,161 (1931).
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warranty.23 If the buyer instead seeks rescission based on fraud or
material misrepresentation, most jurisdictions will consider oral
evidence of the fraud or misrepresentation,24 although a few jurisdictions take a more rigid approach. 5 A standard clause in a form contract should not be sufficient to shield fraud and eliminate a recognized exception to the parol evidence rule. Efforts on behalf of consumers are crippled by a contrary view since the great majority of
cases in which a consumer feels he has been defrauded by deceptive
sales practices probably involves contracts with integration clauses.
The contract is usually a form-pad contract prepared by the seller,
and sellers and their attorneys are widely aware of the advantages of
such clauses. 6
The parol evidence problem is especially troublesome in the
above examples of the overpriced furniture and the non-returnable
sewing machine (cases 3 and 4) because in these cases the oral statements which the buyer seeks to prove are contrary not only to the
general recital that no representations were made, but also to specific
terms of the written contract. In case 3 the oral statement that the
furniture is solid maple would, if allowed in evidence, create an express warranty, 2 but the written form expressly disclaims any warranties. In the sewing machine case the buyer seeks to prove that he
was promised a right to rescind and a five-year guarantee, whereas
the form says there is no right to rescind and only a three-month
guarantee.
In Apolito v. Johnson28 plaintiff sought to rescind a contract to
purchase real estate on the ground that defendant seller had
fraudulently misrepresented both the price and terms of payment.
Plaintiff alleged she was told that the total price would be $26,250, but
the contract actually provided for a price of $52,500. When signing
the contract, plaintiff said she inquired about the higher figure and
213E.g., Quinn v. Bernat, 80 R.I. 375, 97 A.2d 273 (1953); Sanders v. Allis Chalmers Mfg. Co.,

237 S.C. 133. 115 S.E.2d 793 (1960); see CORBIN § 578 and cases at n.40.
"4E.g., Bates v. Southgate, 308 Mass. 170, 31 N.E.2d 551 (1941); Rizzi v. Sussman, 9 App.
Div.2d 961, 195 N.Y.S.2d 672 (1959); Dallas Farm Mach. Co. v. Reaves, 158 Tex. 1, 307
S.W.2d 233 (1957); Wachtman v. Derran Food Plan, 71 Dauph, 121 (C.P. Dauphin Co., Pa.

1957);seeCORBN § 578 at n.42.
e.g., Collins v. Abel Holding Co., 89 Ga. App. 337, 79 S.E.2d 436 (1953).
" See Duesenberg, The Manufacturer'sLast Stand: The Disclaimer,20 Bus. LAW. 159, 1622See,

63 (1964).
'7

UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE

§ 2-313 [hereinafter cited as UCC].

"3 Ariz. App. 358,414 P.2d 442 (1966).
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was told by seller, "That don't mean nothing . . . . Don't wofry
about it. That is something that has to be marked in there for the
escrow people."29 The court held that the evidence of the alleged fraud
was inadmissible because of the parol evidence rule and that plaintiff
was not entitled to rescind the contract..
[The] purported representations . . . were contrary to and
inconsistent with the express terms of the written contract executed by
the parties. Evidence of such statements which are squarely against
the terms of the writing cannot be received or counted upon to support
a finding of fraud, for to allow otherwise would do violence to the
0
parol evidence rule. 3
The decision in Apolito unfortunately is consistent with much
authority from other jurisdictions,3 although it may be against the
trend of modern decisions.32 If a generalized merger clause does not
bar proof of fraud, then a more specific clause should not be effective
unless the real basis of the decision is the contributory negligence of
the buyer. 31 "Assuming fraud, the emphasis upon details merely
indicates a more elaborate trap. If all that is needed to make
exculpatory clauses effective is the use of a few more words,
fraudulent dealers can be counted upon to use them."34
The parol evidence rule is a vague doctrine with ample exceptions,
and it need not prevent a court from hearing any evidence which
shows deceptive or fraudulent sales practices on the part of a seller.
It may be that courts are rightly suspicious of oral evidence which
would vitiate a written contract between merchants. However, in the
merchant-consumer area the courts must take account of the realities
of a marketplace where false representations and promises are used to
induce buyers to sign form-pad contracts designed to cut off the
buyer's rights. Perhaps most courts are already aware of this, and the
greatest obstacle posed by the parol evidence rule may be that it
3 3 Ariz. App. 232, 234,413 P.2d 291, 293 (1966).
333 Ariz. App. at 359, 414 P.2d at 443.
SI

E.g., Newmark v. H & H Prods. Mfg. Co., 128 Cal. App. 2d 35, 274 P.2d 702 (1954);

Greenwald v. Food Fair Stores Corp., 100 So. 2d 200 (Fla. App. 1958).
" E.g., Nelson Realty Co. v. Darling Shop, Inc., 267 Ala. 301, 101 So. 2d 78 (1958);
Cobbledick-Kibbe Glass Co. v. Pugh, 161 Cal. App.2d 123, 326 P.2d 197 (1958); Texas
& P. Ry. v. Presley, 137 Tex. 232, 152 S.W.2d 1105 (1941); Mawhinney v. Jensen, 120
Utah 142, 232 P.2d 769 (1951).
"As to the role of contributory fault, see Seavey, Caveat Emptor as of 1960, 38 TEXAS L. REV.
439,446-47 (1960).
3' Seavey, supra note 33, at 448-49.

DUKE LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 1968: 831

intimidates counsel and often deters them from developing oral
evidence pointing to fraud. With regard to the parol evidence rule,
Corbin states:
Without doubt it has deterred counsel from making an adequate
analysis and research and from offering parol testimony that was
admissible for many purposes. Without doubt, also it has caused the
court to refuse to hear testimony that ought to have been heard. The
mystery of the written word is still such that a paper document may
close the door to a showing that it was never assented to as a complete
3
integration.
B.

Puffing

Assuming that the parol evidence rule does not bar evidence of the
deceptive sales practices, the next problem which buyer's counsel will
encounter is the permissive view of "puffing" by a seller. At common
law a misrepresentation by a seller or his agent did not give rise to any
legal remedy if it was considered a statement of opinion, a category
generally considered to include most statements of value, vague
commendations, and predictions of future events.3 6 If the
misrepresentation was made innocently, it was not considered to be
materially misleading and, even if intentional, it was not considered
fraudulent.
The rules allowing puffing were based upon the expectation that
the buyer would behave as a reasonably prudent man who would
presumably not rely upon statements of opinion by a party with an
adverse interest. 37 The law was shaped for cynical traders, with little
concern for the millions of consumers who lack the prudence of the
law's hypothetical reasonable man. It is interesting to contrast the
common law's approach to puffing with the approach of the FTC in
interpreting section 5 of the Federal Trade Commission Act
outlawing "unfair or deceptive acts or practices. 318 The Commission
holds that a practice is not considered deceptive unless it has a capacity to deceive the public, but this includes "the ignorant, the un582, at 447.
':See UCC § 2-313(2); W. PROSSER, TORTS § 104 (1964) [hereinafter cited as PROSSER]; I S.
WILLISTON, SALES §§ 202-03 (rev. ed. 1948) [hereinafter cited as WILLIsToN, SALEs]; 3 Id.
§§ 628-30. Keeton, Fraud:Misrepresentationsof Opinion, 21 MINN. L. REV. 643 (1937).
1,RESTATEMENT OF COTRACTS §§ 470(2), 474 (1932); Harper & McNeely, A Synthesis of
3 CORBIN §

the Law of Misrepresentation,22 MINN. L. REV. 939, 942-45"(1938); cf Keeton, supra note 36,

at 650-51.
33

15 U.S.C. § 46 (1964).
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thinking and the credulous, who in making purchases, do not stop to
analyze but too often are governed by appearances and general impressions." 9 A brief glance at the FTC decisions is sufficient to demonstrate that a great many practices which were usually considered
not actionable at common law are held to be unlawful under section
5 of the Act."
The only case above which clearly falls outside the puffing
category is case 1, in which the seller used false assertions of official
authority to intimidate the buyers. All the other misrepresentations
are arguably privileged. In the referral-sales scheme (case 2) the
representation that the buyer of the refrigerator will be able to earn
more than enough money from his referral commissions to cover the
easy monthly payments falls into a standard puffing category,
predictions of future events. 4 In case 3 involving false description of
the goods, most of the statements of the furniture salesman ("best on
the market," "never wear out," "high quality furniture") might also
be considered statements of opinion which would not constitute
fraud.4 2 However, the statement that the wood is solid maple in case 3
would be considered a statement of fact. Case 4 may involve still
another category of permissible puffing, if the salesman's assertions
as to the terms of the contract are seen as misrepresentations of law.
"[A] conscious misstatement of the meaning of certain terms in a
written instrument has been held immaterial."4 In case 5 the statement that the encyclopedia is worth $989 might be considered a
mere statement of value. The buyer is on stronger ground, however,
with respect to the statement that the supplement is sold to the buyer
at its "actual cost" since misrepresentations of cost, unlike mis" Aronberg v. FTC, 132 F.2d 165, 167 (7th Cir. 1942); see, e.g., Moretrench Corp. v. FTC,
127 F.2d 792 (2d Cir. 1942); General Motors Corp. v. FTC, 114 F.2d 33, 36 (2d Cir. 1940).
4
1See,
e.g., 2 TRADE REG. REP.
7533.37, at 12,036, & 7837.85, at 12039-40. "It is
easy to understand that national policy concerning consumer protection did not focus on the
tort model: the reasonable man. He did not need protection from the blandishments of ambiguous advertising because of his inherent skepticism. Where falsity was more clearly the prob-

lem, he was known to inspect and make his own evaluation."
COMPETITION 7 (1967).

ALEXANDER, HONESTY AND

"See McAlpine Co. v. Graham, 320 S.W.2d 951 (Mo. App. 1959); Cummings v. Lehigh
Brickface, Inc., II Cumb. 70 (C. P. Cumberland Co., Pa. 1960).
11E.g., American Laundry Mach. Co. v. Skinner, 225 N.C. 285, 34 S.E.2d 190 (1945);
Currie v. Mohasco Indus., Inc., 371 S.W.2d 771 (Tex. Civ. App. 1963); RESTATEMENT OF CONTRACTS
4' 5 S.

§ 474, Illustration 3 (1932).
WILLISTON, CONTRACTS

CONTRACTS].

§ 1495 (rev. ed. 1937) [hereinafter cited as

WILLISTON,
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representations of value, do not constitute privileged puffing. The
paper thin distinction between the two is illustrated by cases holding
that misrepresentations of value go beyond permissible puffing if
they amount to a misrepresentation of "market value" or "standard
selling price.""
The rules permitting puffing have not been consistently applied,
and courts have nearly always disregarded the rules in extreme cases,
as in a case where property worth $2500 was sold for $15, the buyer
representing that the property was "worth $15 to him."45 Furthermore, the scope of permissible puffing varies widely from one case to
another. On one hand, it has been held that statements that an
automobile will get 18 miles per gallon,46 or that a dealer's trucks will
not consume any more gas and oil than those presently owned by a
customer,4 7 are non-acti6nable statements of opinion. On the other
hand, statements that goods are of "first grade quality"4 or that an
automobile is in "A-I condition" 49 have been held to constitute a basis
for relief. Such decisions are not necessarily inconsistent since there is
a growing awareness that statements of fact can be distinguished
from statements of opinion only if the court takes into consideration
the circumstances under which the statements were made.
Statements very positive in form, asserting facts without
qualification, may be held to be only those of opinion, where the
recipient is aware that the speaker has no sufficient information or
knowledge as to what he asserts; and . . . there are numerous
circumstances in which statements which are in form only of opinion
will be held to convey the assertion of accompanying facts. 0
Under the older cases a seller could lie with impunity so long as he
avoided statements of existing fact. This approach has been frequently
criticized," and the pressure to narrow the categories of permissible
" E.g., Gray v. Wikstrom Motors, Inc., 14 Wash.2d 448, 128 P.2d 490 (1942).
" Benedict v. Dickins' Heirs, 119 Conn. 541, 177 A. 715 (1935).
" Batchelder v. Birchard Motors, Inc., 120 Vt. 429, 144 A.2d 298 (1958).
"7Patev. J.S. McWilliams Auto Co., 193 Ark. 620, 101 S.W.2d 794 (1937).
,1Diepeveen v. Larry Vogt, Inc., 27 N.J. Super. 254,256, 99 A.2d 329, 330 (1953).
41Smith v. Leppo, 360 Mich. 557, 559, 104 N.W.2d 128, 129 (1960).
" PROSSER § 104, at 736; RESTATEMENT OF CONTRACTS § 474, Comments a-c (1932);
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 539(1) (rent. Draft No. 10, 1964); see 3 WILLISTON,
SALES § 628.

11E.g., PROSSER § 104, at 737 &n.12, 739, 741; RESTATEMENT (SECOND) oFTORTS
542 (Tent. Draft No. 10, 1964); Seavey, supra note 33, at 442.

§§ 539,
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puffing has produced numerous exceptions to the rule. 2 Perhaps the
most common means the courts use to avoid the rule is to find that a
statement of opinion conveys an implied assertion of fact.53 Several
other rationales are available, and the recent reformulation of the
scope of permissible puffing in the Restatement (Second) of Torts has
proliferated the exceptions to a point where little is left of the rule.
Statements of opinion may be actionable (1)if the maker knows of
facts incompditible with the opinion expressed, 4 or (2) if he does not
know of sufficient facts to justify the opinion,55 or (3) if he purports to
have special knowledge, 6 or (4) if he has secured the confidence of the
hearer, or (5) if he has any other special reason to expect the hearer
to rely upon the opinion," or (6) if the opinion is one of law and
expressly or impliedly includes a misrepresentation of fact. 8
Any absolute exemption from liability for puffing would seem to
be on the way out, although one can still find many backward looking
decisions. What remains of the exemption should be limited to honest
statements of opinions and should not shield intentional
misrepresentations. This viewpoint was adopted in the Tentative
Draft of the Restatement (Second) of Torts. 9 Many courts also
endorse this point of view, at least where it is possible to find that the
seller possesses superior knowledge or superior means of information.6" In a case involving misleading promises and statements of
value, the D.C. Municipal Court of Appeals stated:
A mere misstatement of value of property may be deemed a fraudulent misrepresentation of fact, where there is special reliance
placed upon it and superior knowledge on the part of the promisor,
and where the misstatement is made under conditions which show
that it was intended . . . to be treated as an immediate factor inducing action and was made with knowledge that it would be accept6
ed as a basis of action. '
5 See PROSSER § 104; RESTATEMENT OF CONTRACTS § 474 and Comments a-c (1932);
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §§ 538A, 539, 542 (rent. Draft No. 10, 1964); Keeton, supra
note 36, at 643 (1937).
5

See Crown Cork & Seal Co. v. Hires Bottling Co., 371 F.2d 256 (7th Cir. 1967); Acme
Equip. Corp. v. Montgomery Coop. Creamery Ass'n, 29 Wis. 2d 355, 138 N.W.2d 729 (1966).
11RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OFTORTS § 539(1)(a) (Tent. Draft No. 10, 1964).
55Id. § 539(1)(b).
56Id. § 542(a).
" Id. §§ 542(b), (c), (d).
51
1d. § 545.
5 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 542(d) and Comment i(Tent. Draft No. 10, 1964).
E.g., Shepherd v. Woodson, 328 S.W.2d I (Mo. 1959); Russell v. Industrial Transp. Co.,
113 Tex. 441, 251 S.W. 1034, 51 A.L.R. 1 (1923); see PROSSER § 104, at 742-43; RESTATEMENT
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This rationale is broad enough to cover nearly all cases of intentional
deception of consumers if it is recognized that in most consumer
transactions the seller does possess superior knowledge concerning
the product being sold and concerning the legal effect of the seller's
form-pad contract.
C.

The Innocent Principal
Assuming that the buyer is able to introduce evidence of
misrepresentations on the part of the seller and that such
misrepresentations constitute fraud or material misrepresentations
rather than mere puffing, the buyer may next encounter the contention
that the fault is that of the salesman-agent and that there is therefore
no remedy against the innocent corporate principal who was the
actual seller.6 2 The theory behind this argument is essentially one of
agency law-the agent was not authorized to make the
misrepresentations alleged by buyer and buyer was on notice of this
lack of authority since the written contract stated that no representations were made unless contained in the written contract.
An example of the role the above doctrine can play in perpetrating
fraud is provided by Holland Furance Co. v. Williams.63 In this case,
plaintiff brought suit for the purchase price of a furnace sold to
defendants by an agent of the plaintiff. The contract signed by
defendants stated: "This Contract Contains the Entire Agreement
Between the Parties. Verbal Understandings and Agreements with
Representatives Shall Not Bind the Seller Unless Set Forth Herein.
There are No Warranties, Express or Implied, Other than those
Herein Stated." Defendants sought to avoid the contract on the
ground of fraud, alleging that the representatives of the seller told
defendant that their old furnace allowed carbon monoxide gas to
escape into the house and that defendants and their children would be
asphyxiated unless the old furnace was immediately replaced. These
statements were alleged to be false and fraudulent and to have induced
(SECOND) OF TORTS § 542(a) (Tent. Draft No. 10, 1964); cf RESTATEMENT OF CONTRACTS

§ 474(a) (1932); RESTATEMENT OF RESTITUTION § 8(3)(b) (1937).
"Hiltpold v. Stern, 82 A.2d 123, 126 (D.C. Mun. Ct. App. 195 1).
62This defense is not available unless the principal is really innocent. If the principal desires

the agent to make the misrepresentation, or suspects that the agent may make it, the principal
will be held to have impliedly authorized the misrepresentation. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF
AGENCY § 260, Comment b (1958).
63179 Kan. 321,295 P.2d 672 (1956).
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the sale. The court held that proof of these allegations would not
constitute a defense because the agent had no authority to bind
plaintiffs by such statements.
The doctrine applied by the court in Holland Furnace places the
risk of fraud on a buyer who had an opportunity to know of the
salesman's limited authority even though the fraud serves the interests
of the seller. This may be reasonable in transactions between
businessmen.6 It is unfair, however, when applied to an
unsophisticated consumer who has limited understanding of the
meaning of the written contract. Fortunately, a majority of
jurisdictions no longer deprive a buyer of the remedy of rescission
based on an agent's misrepresentations merely because of statements
in a written contract which disclaim responsibility for the agent's
representation.65 The buyer is allowed to rescind in such cases prior to
a change of position by the principal. Shipping or delivering goods
covered by the contract of sale is riot considered such a change of
position as will deprive the buyer of his remedy. 6 This is reasonable
since rescission involves the return to seller of any goods received by
the buyer, and an allowance to seller for the fair rental value of buyer's use. 67 However, the buyer may still lose the right to rescind in a
a third person to obtain the
case where the seller must contract with
61
buyer.
the
to
sold
goods which are to be
D.

Affirmance of the Contract

The next obstacles in the path of a buyer seeking to rescind may be
the equitable rules prescribing the manner in which the right of
rescission must be exercised. These rules, like the rules of puffing, are
founded upon 19th century assumptions concerning how the
reasonably prudent man should behave-upon discovery of the
misrepresentation; he should promptly manifest to the seller his
election to rescind the contract, tendering the return to the seller of
anything received in the transaction, and thereafter holding his tender open by refraining from exercising dominion over the goods he
has received and by exercising reasonably care to protect them. 9 If
"See Ernst Iron Works v. Duralith Corp., 270 N.Y. 165, 200 N.E. 683 (1936).
65See

RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY

§ 260(2) (1958) (Reporter's Notes cite cases).

"67 E.g., Harnischfeger Sales Corp. v. Coats, 41 Cal. 2d 319,48 P.2d 662 (1935).
5CORBIN §§ 1107, 1114-15
"See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 8B(3) (1958).
69E.g., Fines v. West Side Implement Co., 56 Wash.2d 304, 352 P.2d 1018 (1960); 5 CORBIN
§§ 1104, 1114-16;

RESTATEMENT

OF CONTRACTS

§§ 480-84 (1932);

RESTATEMENT

OF
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the seller refuses to allow rescission the buyer must promptly file
suit.70 Failure to comply with any of these conditions may deprive
the buyer of the right of rescission.1 '
These rules are heartbreakingly unrealistic when applied to many
low income consumers. Caplovitz found that many of the consumers
he interviewed were "too naive, too uniformed, too intimidated to
know their rights or to exercise them when they do." 72 As a result,
half of the consumers interviewed by Caplovitz did not complain to
the merchant even if they felt that they had been cheated." If consumers seek professional legal help, it will often be not when they
first discover the seller's misrepresentations, but much later when a
financial crisis is precipitated by sickness or loss of employment, or
by a foreclosure or garnishment by the seller. Furthermore, unscrupulous merchants may be able to intimidate consumers who complain
or attempt to rescind. A recent case describes such conduct as
follows:
Any attempts made by consumers to cancel contracts, even as early as
the very next day, before any delivery of a product was made, were
met with threats to enforce the penalty clause (20% of the contract
price) contained in the installation order. ***[A]ny complaint was
met with ugly and unscrupulous threats to garnishee and to cause
consumers to lose their jobs and the institution of law suits.74
RESTITUTION §§ 64-67 (1937). The Uniform Commercial Code does not significantly change
these rules. Shreve v. Castro Trailer Sales, Inc., 150 W. Va. 669, 149 S.E.2d 238 (1966). It is
possible that the rules of Parts 6 & 7 of Article Two of the Code do not apply to all cases of
rescission of the contract for fraud or material misrepresentation since these parts seem
concerned only with the situation where rejection of the goods and "cancellation" of the contract
arise out of the failure of the goods or the tender of delivery to conform to the contract. UCC
§§ 2-601, 2-608(l). But cf id. § 2-721. If this is so, then the common law decisions concerning
rescission of the contract for fraud or material misrepresentation continue to state the applicable
standard. See UCC § 1-103. Cases for rescission based on fraud arising under the Code have
often not considered the possibility that Article Two would be relevant to the means of exercising
rescission. E.g., Myers v. Rubin, 399 Pa. 363, 160 A.2d 559 (1960). However, if the Code does
govern the manner of rescission in all cases subject to Article Two, the election to rescind must
still be made in much the same manner as at common law. See UCC §§ 2-602(l), 2-606(i)(c),
2-608(2).
70 Fines v. West Side Implement Co., 56 Wash.2d 304,352 P.2d 1018 (1960).
71E.g., Cummings v. Jack Hurwitz, Inc., 204 A.2d 332 (D.C. Ct. App. 1964); Wolin v. Zenith
Homes, Inc., 219 Md. 242, 146 A.2d 197, cert. denied, 361 U.S. 831 (1959); Caruso v. Moy, 164
Neb. 68, 81 N.W.2d 826 (1957); Hajoca Corp. v. Brooks, 249 N.C. 10, 105 S.E.2d 123 (1958);

McBee v. Moody, 358 S.W.2d 215 (rex. Civ. App. 1962);

RESTATEMENT OF RESTITUTION

§ 148 (1937).
71CAPLovrrz at 169.
3
' Id. at 171.
"State v. ITM, Inc., 52 Misc. 2d 39,51,275 N.Y.S.2d 303, 318-19 (Sup. Ct. 1966).
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Fortunately, there is a considerable amount of leeway in the above
rules regulating the exercise of the remedy of rescission. Since the
standard required of the buyer is basically one of reasonableness,
which is usually a question for the trier of fact, judges and juries will
sometimes bend the rules to favor a deceived consumer, particularly
if the seller is guilty of deliberate fraud or if the buyer's delay was
induced by misleading assurances of the seller.75 Nevertheless, the
buyer will find it extremely difficult to obtain rescission if he used the
goods for any appreciable period without complaining at all, or
without any grounds for expecting that the seller would remedy his
complaints. Ironically, the seller who bluntly repudiates the buyer's
complaints and denies any responsibility will be in a better posture to
resist a subsequent claim for rescission than the merchant who
attempts to meet the buyer's complaints in some fashion. In the
former case the buyer is considered solely responsible for the delay in
electing rescission.
The Restatement of Contracts gives the following illustration of
this fact:
A fraudulently induces B to buy an automobile from A. B discovers the fraud and immediately offers to return the machine to A,
on condition that money and notes given for the price be returned. A
refuses to accept the machine and make restitution. B, thereafter uses
the machine and also brings an action for restitution. He cannot
recover. His continued use of the machine is an affirmance of the
transaction. 6
One can hardly expect the unfortunate furniture buyer in case 3
above to refrain from using the merchandise and to store it for use of
the seller pending the outcome of a lawsuit. Nor is the purchaser of a
sewing machine or encyclopedia, once his complaints have been
rebuffed by the seller, likely to refrain from using the goods. Probably
few buyers in any income bracket possess this degree of legal

"See, e.g., Tuscaloosa Motor Co. v. Cockrell, 272 Ala. I, 132 So. 2d 742 (1958); Gross
v. Rosenhaus, 282 App. Div. 129, 121 N.Y.S.2d 803 (1953), appeal dismissed, 306 N.Y. 631,
116 N.E. 2d 241 (1953); Brown v. Hassenstab, 212 Or. 246, 319 P.2d 929 (1957); Lester v.
Percy, 58 VASH. 2d 501, 364 P.2d 423 (1961); RESTATEMENT OF RESTITUTION § 64, Comment c and Illustrations 5 &7 (1937).
7 Compare RESTATEMENT OF CONTRACTS § 482, Illustration 1 (1932), with id. § 484,

Illustration 3.
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sophistication. Unfortunately, the Restatement's story about A and B
has as little relevance to the situation of the buyer in the slums as the
Dick and Jane reader has to the life of his children.
E. Failureto Read the Contract
In each of the five cases outlined above, the buyer may well have
signed the contract without reading it carefully, or without reading it
at all. The interviews reported by Caplovitz show that this is very
common," and it is also a factor which frequently crops up in cases.78
A typical example is described by the D.C. Municipal Court of
Appeals: "Mrs. Saylor, who at seventeen years of age handled the
family's financial matters because of her husband's illiteracy, testified
only that she 'glanced through it'; without noticing at the bottom of
the paper the warning in bold print. . . -79The willingness of
consumers to sign blank contracts has been recognized by many state
legislatures which have passed laws requiring installment contracts-to
state in large print, "Do Not Sign This Agreement if it Contains Any
Blank Space."80 If a buyer nevertheless signs a blank contract, and the
price or payment terms later written into the contract vary from the
terms of the buyer's agreement, he is allowed to rescind."
Apparently, signing a contract lacks, in the minds of many
consumers, the mystic significance accorded to this act by the
common law. This factor is relevant primarily in case 4 above where
the buyer, by carefully reading the contract instead of relying upon the
seller's misrepresentation of its contents, could have discovered that it
did not accord with her understanding of the transaction. It is often
stated that a party who is negligent in failing to read a document
which he signs will not be allowed later to- object to its contents, and in
the past some courts have insisted on this view even when it meant
rewarding the fraud of one party because of the negligence of the
other. Today the legal encyclopedias are still giving color to this
view,82 but the courts almost universally hold that a party's failure to
"CAPLOVITZ at

144-45.

E.g., Hollywood Credit Clothing Co. v. Gibson, 188 A.2d 348 (D.C. Ct. App. 1963).

,Saylor v. Handley Motor Co., 169 A.2d 683, 684 (D.C. Mun. Ct. App. 196 1).
"Credit Union Guide § 9031.2.
"Universal C.I.T. Credit Corp. v. Hudgens, 234 Ark. 1127, 356 S.W.2d 658 (1962); Saylor v.
Handley Motor Co., 169 A.2d 683 (D.C. Mun. Ct. App. 196 1).
2See 17 C.J.S. Contracts § 138 (1963); 37 Am. Jur. 2d Fraud& Deceit § 269 (1968); 23 Am.
Jur., Fraud& Deceit § 171 (1939).
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read a contract will not bar him from obtaining rescission where the
other party is guilty of fraud or material misrepresentation. 3
F.

Other Obstacles to Rescission

The buyer who is not barred from rescission by any of the above
legal obstacles may still encounter various other difficulties. In a kind
of penumbra to the parol evidence rule, the court may require that the
proof of facts which entitle buyer to rescind the written contract must
go beyond a mere preponderance of the evidence and be shown by
"clear and convincing evidence." 8 This would be especially true in
cases involving verbal warranties which are disclaimed by the contract or misstatement of the contract terms, since the parol evidence
in such cases disparages the validity of specific provisions in the
contract. In such cases Corbin indicates that the buyer's evidence of
fraud or mistake will need to be "strongly supported by circumstances
or by disinterested witnesses." 5
It is sometimes held that rescission will not be allowed unless
damages can be shown, 6 but the weight of authority is to the
contrary.17 This factor might be important in the fear-sale example
of case I in the unlikely event that the value of the sink attachment
was equal to the contract price.
Another obstacle is the requirement that the misrepresentation be
an inducing cause of the contract, and if the misrepresentation was
innocent rather than fraudulent, the misrepresentation must be
material as well. 8 This might be a factor in case 3, if the buyer did
not really care whether the furniture was maple, birch or pine.
However, it is presumed that any material misrepresentation is an
inducing cause of the transaction, so it would be necessary for the
seller to produce evidence indicating lack of reliance by the buyer. 9 In
"3E.g., Saylor v. Handley Motor Co., 169 A.2d 683 (D.C. Mun. Ct. App. 1961); Lippire v.
Eckel, 178 Neb. 643, 134 N.W.2d 802 (1965); CORBIN § 607 at 656; 3 WILLISTON, SALES
§ 634, at 443; RESTATEMENT OF CONTRACTS § 505 (1932).
" RESTATEMENT OF CONTRACTS § 511 (1932); see CORBIN § 581, at 440.
"CORBIN § 585, at 486.
E.g., Russell v. Industrial Transp. Co., 113 Tex. 441, 251 S.W. 1034, 51 A.L.R. 1 (1923).
"See PROSSER § 105, at 749-50 & nn.35-41; WILLISTON, CONTRACTS § 1525, at 4271 &
n.10.
"3 WILLISTON, SALES §§ 627, 633; RESTATEMENT OF CONTRACTS § 476 and Comment b,
§ 471 and Comment i (1932); RESTATEMENT OF RESTITUTION § 9 (1937).
"1RESTATEMENT OF CONTRACTS § 479 (1932).
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addition, it is not necessary that the fraud or misrepresentation
constitute the sole inducing cause; it needs only to have been a
material inducement. 0
The above gamut of substantive and procedural limitations will
make it difficult for the buyer to rescind the contract in any of the 5
cases above. The salesman's misrepresentatiors concerning referral
commissions (case 2) and concerning the encyclopedia (case 5) may
be considered to be only permissible puffing. The same is true in case 3
except for the statement that the wood is solid maple. The parol
evidence problem may be insurmountable in cases 3 and 4 where
evidence of the furniture salesman's false description of the goods and
the sewing machine salesman's misstatement of the contract terms
directly contravenes specific language in the signed contracts. In any
event, it is likely that the buyer will have failed to act with sufficient
celerity and decisiveness to meet the requirements for exercising the
remedy of rescission and avoiding affirmance of the contract.
In case 1, involving a fear sale, affirmance should be the only substantial obstacle to rescission, however,' and the buyer of the sewing machine in case 4 may still be entitled to reformation even if she
fails to qualify for rescission.
CONTRACT LAW-DAMAGES

If the remedy of rescission is for some reason unavailable, the
aggrieved buyer may next consider the possibility of obtaining a
remedy on the contract. 2 This will be a realistic possibility principally
in cases where the obstacle to rescission is affirmance of the contract
resulting from failure to promptly elect the remedy of rescission. As
the discussion below will indicate, the parol evidence problem is
probably greater if the buyer seeks contract damages than if he seeks
rescission, and the innocent-principal defense may also be more
formidable. The rules concerning puffing are virtually the same,93
and if the salesman's puffing is not considered grounds for rescission,
it will not give rise to a right to recover damages. A further restric" 3 WILuSrON, SALES § 633 and authorities cited therein at n.6.
" For an analogous case where buyers were able to obtain a remedy see Bross v. Home
Supermarket Grocery Co., 32 Pa. D. &C.2d 75 (Co. Ct. of Phila. 1962).
1 1 have treated the action for breach of warranty as a contractual remedy, although
warranties are often not consensual and sometimes arise where there is no contract.
"See PROSSER § 104; WILLISTON, SALES § 203. In some cases, a misrepresentation which
will constitute grounds for rescission may be insufficiently definite to give rise to a warranty.
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tion arises out of the nature of the contract remedy which requires
the showing of a breach resulting in measurable money damages to
the buyer.94
Misrepresentations by way of inducement are often collateral to
the contract terms, as in case I (fear sale) and case 2 (referral-sales
scheme). In such cases the misrepresentations do not evidence
a breach of contract and usually do not produce discrete money
damages. In case 4 the buyer of the sewing machine will be able
to show a breach only if she is first able to have the contract
reformed to reflect the actual terms of her understanding with the
salesman. 5 Assuming this is done, she probably will still not be
relieved of the obligation to pay for the sewing machine. Although the
seller would be guilty of a breach if it refused to allow Mrs. Daley to
return the machine within 30 days, she may have lost her right to
return the machine if she continued to use it after initially seeking to
return it and being rebuffed. 96 She may be unable to prove any money
damages resulting from seller's refusal to allow her to return the
machine. With respect to the five-year guarantee, she can presumably
recover damages in the amount of any repairs she has been forced to
pay because of the seller's failure to honor the guarantee and she can
also seek assurance of future performance. 91 However, this may be an
unsatisfactory remedy if what she really wants is to avoid having the
seller levy on her furniture to enforce payment of the purchase price.
The most difficult questions concerning the possibility of
recovering damages for breach of contract arise in connection with the
furniture salesman's statements in case 3. Under the Uniform
Commercial Code, the statement of the salesman that the furniture
was solid maple would create an express warranty to that effect."
It may be argued that § 2-721 of the Uniform Commercial Code changes this. The section
states that "Irlemedies for material misrepresentation or fraud include all remedies available
under this Article for non-fraudulent breach." Literally this might mean that if there is fraud
in the inducement of a contract, one can recover damages for non-delivery or breach of
warranty, even though there has been no non-delivery or breach. See UCC §§ 2-711, 2-713,
2-714. To make sense out of § 2-721, it must be read as applying only where the fraud or
material misrepresentation corresponds to some non-fraudulent breach for which the code

provides a remedy.
9
See Brandwein v. Provident Mut. Life Ins. Co., 3 N.Y.2d 491, 146 N.E.2d 693, 168
N.Y.S.2d 964 (1957).
96 UCC §§ 2-606(l)(c) and Comment 4, 2-607(1), 2-608(2).
"Id. § 2-609.

"Id.§ 2-313(l)(b).
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The written contract, however, expressly disclaims the existence of
any express warranties. The inconsistency would be resolved in favor
of the consumer by virtue of section 2-316(1) of the Code, which provides that warrantly limitations are inoperative to the extent that
they are inconsistent with an express warranty arising from the seller's words or conduct. However, this rule of construction in section
2-316(1) is expressly made subject to the provisions of the parol
evidence rule. As noted above, parol evidence of the salesman's
statements to buyer should be admissible for the purpose of showing
fraud or material mistake which would render the agreement voidable. If the instrument is not voidable, the same parol evidence may
be inadmissible for the purpose of establishing a warranty inconsistent with the written disclaimer on the theory that this would not vitiate the contract, but would vary or contradict the terms of the contract. Although some authority expressly takes this point of view,99
and considerably more authority lends it indirect support,' 0 it is not
a view which appeals to one's reason or sense of justice. For example, in Deaver v. J.C. Mahan Motor Co., 0 ' Deaver alleged that
he was induced to purchase a car from defendant by false representations that the car was in good condition and had never been in a
wreck. He sought rescission of the transaction, or in the alternative
damages for breach of warranty. The lower court held that Deaver
was not entitled to rescission but allowed him to recover damages,
evidently being persuaded that the misrepresentations were actually
made. The Tennessee Supreme Court reversed, holding that parol
evidence could not be relied upon to establish a claim for breach of
warranty because the written instrument stated that there was no
warranty except warranty of title. Thus the fact that plaintiff was not
entitled to the equitable remedy of rescission forced the court to ignore the evidence of misrepresentation altogether. The court might
"Archer v. Bucy, 235 Ark. 244, 357 S.W.2d 636 (1962); Sabo v. Delman, 3 N.Y.2d 155, 143
N.E.2d 906, 164 N.Y.S.2d 714 (1957); Stryker v. Rusch, 8 App. Div.2d 244, 187 N.Y.S.2d 663
(1959); Miller v. Troy Laundry Machinery Co., 178 Okl. 313, 314, 62 P.2d 975, 976 (1936)

(dicta); Deaver v. J.C. Mahan Motor Co., 163 Tenn. 429, 43 S.W.2d 199 (1931); WIGSIORE
§ 2439.
'" Compare, e.g., Barnsdall Refining Corp. v. Birnamwood Oil Co., 92 F.2d 817 (7th Cir.
1937) (evidence admitted in suit for rescission), Bates v. Southgate, 308 Mass. 170, 31 N.E.2d
551 (1941), and Rizzi v. Sussman, 9 App. Div. 2d 961, 195 N.Y.S.2d 672 (1959), with, e.g.,
Quinn v. Bernat, 80 R.I. 375, 97 A.2d 273 (1953), Sanders v. Allis Chalmers Mfg. Co., 230 S.C.
133, 115 S.E.2d 793 (1960), and Baxter v. Ford Motor Co., 168 Wash. 456, 12 P.2d 409 (1932)
(evidence inadmissible in suit for breach of warranty).
101163 Tenn. 429,43 S.W.2d 199 (193 1).
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just as easily have allowed the parol evidence on the ground that the
misrepresentation voided the disclaimer clause and showed that the
contract was not fully integrated. If parol evidence of misrepresentation is admissible to allow one to avoid a written contract entirely in
an action for rescission, it would not seem a radical step to admit
the same parol evidence to allow the buyer to avoid one clause of a
written contract in an action for breach of warranty.' 2 The reasoning
in both cases is the same-if assent to the contract was obtained by
misrepresentation, the instrument is not the kind of "valid written
instrument" which cannot be varied by parol evidence. Although the
weight of pre-Code case law is hostile to this view, courts may justifiably adopt the above view in actions governed by the Uniform
Commercial Code since the Code expressly restricts the parol evidence rule to writings which were "intended by the parties as a final
expression of their agreement."'' 3 The above view is also supported
by some pre-Code cases.' 4 In Lone Star Olds Cadillac v. Vinson'05
plaintiff had purchased a used car from defendant. Plaintiff could
not rescind the contract because the negotiable note given for the
purchase price had passed into the hands of a holder in due course.
Plaintiff instead sued for breach of warranty alleging that seller had
warranted the car to be in good mechanical condition and had promised to repair the car if buyer had any difficulty with it. The contract signed by the plaintiff recited that "no warranties, express or
implied, representations, promises or statements have been made to
plaintiff, unless endorsed on the contract in writing."'0 6 The buyer
testified that he did not read the contract because the salesman told
him it was not necessary to read the instrument and assured him
that the instrument did not affect the oral warranty. The court held
that buyer could recover damages for breach of the oral warranty.
The Lone Star Olds case differs from the false description of the
furniture in case 3 in two respects. First, the seller in the Lone Star
case said that he would guarantee the car to be in good condition; in
case 3 the salesman merely described the furniture as solid maple
without using the word "guarantee." This is not a basis for
2

§ 578 at 406 n.43.
§ 2-202. But see Green Chevrolet v. Kemp, 241 Ark. 62,406 S.W.2d 142 (1966).
E.g., International Milling Co. v. Hachmeister, Inc., 380 Pa. 407, 110 A.2d 186 (1955),
discussed in 2 CORBIN § 482 at 458-59.
01168 S.W.2d 673 (Tex. Civ. App. 1942) (writ of error refused, want of merit).
101
Id. at 674.
'oSee CORBIN
loSUCC
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distinguishing the cases, however, because under the Uniform
Commercial Code the salesman's words of description create an
express warranty just as an express promise or guarantee." 7 The
second difference is that the seller in Lone Star induced the buyer to
sign the contract without reading it by telling buyer that it was a
routine form and he need not read it. This is not meaningfully
different from a case where seller implies by his words or actions that
the signature is a routine matter and buyer need not read the form.
For example, the seller may simply have put the form in front of the
buyer, pointed to a blank and said "sign here." This gives the buyer
little opportunity to read the form and gives him the feeling that
reading it is unnecessary. The case becomes more difficult if buyer's
failure to read the form is not attributable to any action on the part of
the seller. However, the result should still be the same if the buyer in
case 3 signed the form as a routine matter, not intending to modify the
oral agreement or waive any rights and not understanding that he was
doing so, and if the seller knew or had reason to know the buyer did
not understand the contract and the legal consequences of signing it.
This is consistent with the objective theory of contract that a party is
bound by assent to a contract only if his actions lead the other party
to reasonably believe that there was assent. The comment to section 2316(1) of the Code (providing that words creating an express
warranty prevail over inconsistent clauses negating or limiting
warranties) states that the section "seeks to protect a buyer from
unexpected and unbargained language of disclaimer."'' 08 Although
section 2-316(1) is expressly made subject to the parol evidence rule,
the rule should be interpreted in a manner consistent with the
protection section 2-316(1) seeks to provide for buyers. This does not
defeat the purpose of the parol evidence rule or of the reference to the
rule in section 2-316(1), since the rule will still apply in any case in
which the buyer actually or apparently agrees to the clause
disclaiming warranties. 9
UCC § 2-313(2).

107

'Id. § 2-316, Comment I.
,o This view of the parol evidence rule is probably an iconoclastic one. See WIGMORE § § 2434,
2434a. However, it is in complete harmony with Corbin's interpretation of the rule. See 2
CORBIN §§ 582-89. See generally CORBIN §§ 573-96. Corbin often undertakes to explain
contrary authority on the ground that the court actually heard the parol evidence, decided it was
unconvincing, and then invoked the parol evidence rule. This is similar to McCormick's view of
the parol evidence rule as a device to allow the judge to pass on the credibility of oral evidence

Vol. 1968: 8311

CONSUMER REMEDIES

The result urged above can also be reached in a different fashion
under the Uniform Commercial Code. The comments to section 2-202
on parol or extrinsic evidence provide a cross reference to section 2302 on unconscionable clauses in contracts. If a court feels it cannot
consider parol evidence which would give rise to a warranty because
of a written integration clause stating that no oral representations or
warranties were made, the court should always consider whether the
integration clause is unconscionable and should therefore be
disregarded as permitted by section 2-302. In passing on the question
of unconscionability, the court may hear evidence without regard to
the strictures of the parol evidence rule, since section 2-302(2)
expressly provides that the parties are entitled to present evidence
regarding the "commercial setting, purpose, and effect" of the clause
or contract alleged to be unconscionable."' The integration clause
should be considered unconscionable in any case in which the clause is
not bargained for and is not in accord with the expectations of the
buyer, if the salesman knew or had reason to suspect that the buyei
did not understand the effect of the clause. Such a result is strongly
indicated by several of the cases cited in the comments to section 2302, which illustrate the ingenuity of courts prior to enactment of the
code in allowing proof of warranties in spite of clauses in the contract
expressly disclaiming any warranties."'
It is worthwhile to consider whether the furniture buyer in case 3
would have any remedy for breach of contract if the salesman had not
represented the furniture to be solid maple. In this event, the buyer's
claim for breach of warranty would have to rest upon the existence of
an implied warranty of merchantability or of fitness for a particular
purpose. 12 If the furniture is of very poor quality, it may not meet the
minimum standards required for goods to be considered merchantable. Under pre-Code law the parol evidence rule was usually held not to bar evidence of implied warranties," 3 and the
language of the Code reinforces this result."4 However, the written
before the jury hears it. McCormick, The Parol Evidence Rule as a Procedural Device for
Control of the Jury, 41 YALE L.J. 365 (1932).
"I Sinkoff Beverage Co. v. Joseph Schlitz Brewing Co., 51 Misc. 2d 446, 273 N.Y.S.2d 364

(Sup. Ct. 1966);see I R.

ANDERSON, UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE

§ 2-302:5 (1961).

"'See UCC § 2-302, Comment 1. But cf Leff, Unconscionability and the Code-The
Emperor's New Clause, 115 U. PA. L. REv. 485, 50.1-08 (1967).

"'See UCC §§ 2-314,2-315.
"'See 2 CORBIN § 585 at 488; WILLISTON,
1' UCC §§ 2-314, 2-315, 2-316(2).

SALES

§ 239a.
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contract expressly disclaims implied warranties in the manner
authorized by section 2-316(2) of the Code. Most commentators on
the Code have felt that a warranty disclaimer meeting the
requirements of section 2-316(2) is nonetheless subject to challenge on
the ground that it is unconscionable." 5 This view is supported by the
fact that a number of the cases cited in the official comments to
section 2-302 are decisions restricting the operation of warranty
disclaimer clauses. However, the argument has also been made that
since section 2-316 sets forth specific requirements for disclaiming
implied warranties and since the official comments to the section
contain no reference to section 2-302, then a disclaimer meeting the
specific tests of section 2-316 cannot be held ineffective under section
2-302."'6 This argument is not persuasive. Any student of the Code
learns at an early date that he cannot rely exclusively on the cross
references provided by the official comments. Furthermore, section 2316(2) does not say that a disclaimer clause is effective if it meets the
requirements of that section-it only states that the clause is
ineffective if it fails to meet those requirements." 7 The view that
warranty disclaimers should be tested exclusively by the requirements
of section 2-316 is an overly technical approach and could lead to
disquieting results. Suppose, for instance, that a buyer expressly and
unambiguously agrees that there is to be no warranty of merchantability. The written contract states that there is no warranty
of merchantability, but this language is not conspicuous. A literal
application of section 2-316 would make the disclaimer ineffective and
the buyer could assert a warranty of merchantability under section
2-314, although he clearly understood there was to be no such warranty. This result can be avoided by the application of section 1-203
requiring good faith in the enforcement of a contract, although there
is no cross reference to section 1-203 in the comments to section
2-316. Conversely, if the disclaimer is included in conspicuous language, but it was not bargained for and the buyer was induced to
overlook the disclaimer in signing the contract, the buyer should be
entitled to invoke section 2-302 to avoid the disclaimer. The prohi"' E.g., R.

DUESENBERG

& L. KING, SALES AND BULK TRANSFERS UNDER

§§ 7.03(l)(b)(iii) at 7-37 & 7.03(2) at 7-46 (1966); W.

THE UCC,

HAWKLAND, SALES AND BULK SALES

48

(1958); Donnelly, After the Fallofthe Citadel, 19 SYRACUSE L. REV. 1,26 (1967); Note, 109 U.
PA. L. REV. 401, 420 (1961),
Z16 Leff, supra note I11, at 523.
..But see UCC § 2-316(3)(a).

Vol. 1968: 831]

CONSUMER

REMEDIES

bition against unconscionable clauses, like the requirement of good
faith, is a broad principle cutting across all the provisions of Article
Two of the Code.
In case 3, the buyer was led to believe by the blandishments of the
salesman that he was purchasing good quality furniture. The written
contract, however, by disclaiming the warranty of merchantability,
deprived buyer of any legal assurance that the furniture would even be
fit for use as furniture."' If buyer was aware that he was buying on a
no-warranty basis and the seller was not willing to stand behind
the goods even to a limited degree, there is no objection to the
warranty disclaimer. On the other hand, if the seller acquired buyer's
signature on a form designed to shield the seller from the
consequences of buyer's inevitable disappointment, while expressly or
impliedly representing that the signature was a formal matter of no
importance, the courts should have no difficulty in striking down the
disclaimer clause as unconscionable. If this is done, then the buyer
may be able to recover damages for breach of the implied warranty of
merchantability.
There are also defenses which are peculiar to the action for breach
of warranty. One problem is the notice requirement of section 2607(3)(a) of the Code. This section states that a buyer is barred from
any remedy for breach of contract unless he notifies the seller of the
breach "within a reasonable time after he discovers or should have
discovered any breach." As mentioned above, low income consumers
often fail to complain when they feel they have been cheated, and it
would be unfortunate if timidity should deprive such buyers of their
remedy for breach. The official comments to the Code indicate that
courts should be generous to consumers in their interpretation of what
constitutes a reasonable time: "'A reasonable time' for notification
from a retail consumer is to be judged by different standards so that in
his case it will be extended, for the rule of requiring notification is
designed to defeat commercial bad faith, not to deprive a good faith
consumer of his remedy.""' 9 There are already some indications that
the courts will be willing to implement this policy in cases where the
seller has not been prejudiced by delay in giving notice.2 0
'See Id. § 2-314(2)(c).
§ 2-607, Comment 4.

"'
Id.
20

1 See Pritchard v. Liggett & Myers Tobacco Co., 295 F.2d 292 (3d Cir. 196 1).
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Another difficulty may be the "innocent principal" argument,
which was discussed above in connection with the availability of
rescission. The argument is that the agent's statements creating the
warranty were unauthorized and the exculpatory clauses in the
contract gave buyer notice of the lack of authority. This argument is
not available to the seller in any case where the warranty claimed by
the buyer is one arising by implication of law (such as the implied
warranty of merchantability) rather than one arising from the
salesman's statements. Where the warranty is based on the salesman's
statement (such as the "solid maple" statement in case 3), the
principal may not avoid responsibility if it had reason to expect that
the misrepresentation would be made or if it desired the salesman to
make the misrepresentation in order to make the sale, since this would
indicate that the salesman had implied authority.' The remaining
cases, where the agent's statement was neither expressly nor impliedly
authorized, are more difficult, and the law in this area is unclear.
The Restatement (Second) of Agency in section 260 takes the position that an exculpatory clause in a written contract which indicates
that an agent has limited authority does not provide the principal
with a defense to an action for rescission but does provide a defense
to a tort action for deceit. Nothing is said about the effect of the
clause when the buyer seeks damages for breach of warranty. Under
general principles of agency law, constructive notice to the buyer of
the salesman's lack of authority would prevent the principal from
being bound by the misrepresentations.'2 2 On the other hand, some
authorities indicate that if the principal insists upon enforcement of
the contract after obtaining knowledge of the agent's unauthorized
acts, the principal is considered to have ratified the agent's actions
and is therefore liable.'23 This theory apparently destroys the defense
in all cases where the buyer seeks rescission either prior to bringing his
action for breach of warranty, or in an alternate count.
Most American jurisdictions allow plaintiff to recover the "benefit
of his bargain" in a tort action for deceit, with the result that a buyer
who successfully seeks damages because of a salesman's
"IE.g., Dargue v. Chaput, 166 Neb. 69, 88 N.W.2d 148 (1958); Gray v. Wikstrom Motors,
Inc., 14 Wash.2d 448, 128 P.2d 490 (1940); RESTATEMENT OF AGENCY § 256 (1933); see
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 260, Comment b (1958).
2

" See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY §§ 9, 161,258 (1958).
"I Floor v. Mitchell, 86 Utah 203, 41 P.2d 281 (1935); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY

§§ 94, 99 (1958).
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misrepresentation will usually recover the same amount whether he
sues in contract or in tort.' 4 In light of this, it would seem
hypertechnical to allow the exculpatory clause to effectively preclude
damages in one area and not in the other. As noted above, the
Restatement (Second) position is that the exculpatory provision
effectively shields the principal from liability in tort. The case law,
however, is not entirely consistent with this view. The Restatement
(Second) view is supported by some authorities,'2 5 but a majority of
the decisions have permitted tort actions to be maintained against the
principal for the misrepresentation of his agent, despite the existence
of an exculpatory clause, in situations where the agent's fraud is incidental to his regular duties on behalf of the principal and induces a
sale which benefits the principal.'2 6 The same result should follow if
the gravamen of the complaint is breach of warranty instead of tort.
There is no sound reason why an exculpatory clause should be able to
achieve, as a matter of agency law, what cannot be directly achieved
as a matter of contract. The courts have long held that a clause in a
contract which expressly provides that the contract is not contestable
on the ground of fraud is void as against public policy.127 In spite of
such a clause, the contract may be rescinded for fraud or the buyer
may maintain an action for deceit. Today the nation's business is
carried on through agents, and the above rule would be reduced to
impotence if a denial of responsibility for agents' representations
could shield the principal from tort or warranty liability arising out of
an agent's fraud. For whatever reason, recent cases of this kind reveal
few attempts by corporations to disclaim responsibility for statements
of their agents while carrying out their normal duties for the benefit
of their employer.

C. MCCORMICK, DAMAGES § 121 (1935); Note, 47 VA. L. REV. 1209 (1961).
E.g., Herzog v. Capital Co., 27 Cal.2d 349, 164 P.2d 8 (1945).
26 E.g., Lufty v. R.D. Roper & Sons Motor Co., 57 Ariz. 495, 115 P.2d 161 (1941); Utilities
Eng'r Institute v. Criddle, 65 Idaho 201, 141 P.2d 981, 984 (1943) (dictum); National Equip.
Corp. v. Volden, 190 Minn. 596, 252 N.W. 444 (1934); Burns v. Vesto Co., 295 S.W.2d 576
(Mo. Ct. App. 1956); Miller v. Troy Laundry Mach. Co., 178 Okla. 313, 62 P.2d 975 (1936);
Annot., 133 A.L.R. 1360 (1941); Annot., 127 A.L.R. 132, 143-46, 151-52 (1940).
,276A CORBIM § 1516; RESTATEMENT OF CONTRACTS § 573 (1932).
3,
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TORT LAW-DAMAGES

A.

Misrepresentation

A tort action for deceit is the third major remedy which the
common law provides for misrepresentation. Traditionally the
elements of the action of deceit are a false and fraudulent
representation made to induce reliance by the plaintiff, which plaintiff
justifiably relies upon. 2 ' Under the orthodox view no remedy is given
for innocent misrepresentations, but only for statements which are
fraudulent in the sense of being knowingly false, or made recklessly by
29
one who does not know whether the statement is true or false.1
However, an expansion of the tort remedy for misrepresentation has
been underway for some years, and many jurisdictions now allow
recovery for negligent misrepresentations' 30 and for innocent
misrepresentations neither fraudulent nor negligent, if made to induce
a business transaction and relied upon by the plaintiff.'' The gradual
dilution of the requirement of scienter has been widely noted by
commentators.' 32 For example, in Clark Auto Co. v. Reynolds,'

seller's agent had represented to buyer that a used automobile was in
"A- I shape," and that it had not been driven hard. The jury, in answer
to interrogatories, found that the car was not in as good condition as
represented, but that the agent who made the representations did
not know at the time that the car was not in as good condition as
represented. The court found that the buyer could not recover on a
warranty count because of the parol evidence rule, but upheld a
verdict for the buyer on a tort count, stating that the fact that the
agent who made the representations did not know they were false did
not preclude recovery. The court stated, "If the fact does not exist,
,28
PROSSER § 100, at 700; RESTATEMENT OF TORTS §§ 526, 531, 537-38 (1938); cf.
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OFTORTS §§ 531,538 (Tent. Draft No. 10, 1964).
'See PROSSER § 102, at 715-16; cf.RESTATEMENT OF TORTS § 526 (1938).
"0 PROSSER § 102, at 710-24.

, E.g., Lanning v. Sprague, 71 Idaho 138, 227 P.2d 347 (1951); Irwin v. Carlton, 369 Mich.
92, 119 N.W.2d 617 (1963); Ham v. Hart, 58 N.M. 550, 273 P.2d 748 (1954);

PROSSER

§ 102, at

724-29. Prosser lists 18 jurisdictions which impose tort liability for innocent misrepresentations.
"I See Bohlen, Misrepresentationas Deceit, Negligence or Warranty, 42 HARV. L. REV. 733
(1929); Carpenter, Responsibilityfor Intentional,Negligent andInnocent Misrepresentation,24
ILL. L. REv. 749 (1930); Green, Deceit, 16 VA. L. REV. 749 (1930); Miller, Innocent
Misrepresentationas the Basis of an Action for Deceit, 6 TEXAS L. REV. 151 (1928); Williston,
Liabilityfor Honest Misrepresentation,24 HARV. L. REv. 415 (1911); Note, 36 IOWA L. REv.

648 (1951).
"1119 Ind. App. 586,88 N.E.2d 775 (1949).
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and the defendant states of his own knowledge that it does . . . the
law will impute to him a fraudulent purpose."' 34
The tort action may offer several advantages over the contract
remedy. One advantage is avoidance of the parol evidence rule. It is
generally held that the rule does not bar proof of oral misrepresentations in a tort action. 35 Only a few decisions take the view
that the policy behind the parol evidence rule requires that the action
in tort be barred along with the remedy on the contract.
Another advantage is the obvious one that the tort action may
provide a remedy for misrepresentations which induce a contract but
do not give rise to a warranty. For instance, if rescission is not
available in case I where the seller falsely claimed to be from the
Housing Authority, there would be no contractual remedy for the
misrepresentation because there is no breach of contract. The same
would be true of some of the misrepresentations made as inducements
in the referral-sales and phony-gift cases (2 and 5). In tort, however,
if the goods purchased have a fair value which is less than the price
paid by the buyer, the buyer can recover the difference as damages.
This is the so-called "out-of-pocket" measure of damages, and is
generally less favorable to the plaintiff than "benefit-of-bargain"
damages. However, it is impossible to compute benefit-of-bargain
damages in cases like the public authority scheme in case 1, where
the collateral misrepresentation, if true, would not affect the value of
the goods being sold. Jurisdictions which generally allow "benefit of
the bargain" damages will allow plaintiff to recover out of pocket
damages if this is the only appropriate means of measuring
damages.'36 In egregious cases the tort remedy also affords the
37
possibility of recovering punitive damages.
The necessity of computing money damages, however, may
prevent recovery in cases where the value of the goods sold is equal to
the price paid. In case 1, for example, there could be no recovery if the
buyer ended up paying the normal retail price for the sink
attachment which was represented to be required by the Public
114Id. at

592, 88 N.E.2d at 778.

Burns v. Vesto Co., 295 S.W.2d 576 (Mo. Ct. App. 1950); Miller v. Troy Laundry Mach.
Co., 178 Okla. 313, 62 P.2d 975 (1936); PROSSER § 104, at 746-47.
"I Rich v. Price, 340 Mass. 502, 164 N.E.2d 891 (1960); Salter v. Heiser, 39 Wash. 2d 826,
239 P.2d 327 (1951); see C. MCCORMICK, DAMAGES § 121, at 453 (1935); RESTATEMENT
(SECOND) OF ToRTs § 549 & Note to Institute (Tent. Draft No. 11, 1965).
"' See King v. Towns, 102 Ga. App. 895, 118 S.E.2d 121 (1960); PROSSER § 105, at 752.
"I
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Housing Authority. Although the sale was induced by misrepresentations actionable in tort, there would be no tort remedy if
there were no legal damages.'38 Furthermore, the difficulty and
expense of developing proof of damages may bar the assertion of a
remedy as a practical matter-expert testimony may be needed to
establish the value of the goods received. 13 9 In case 5, assuming that
the "value" of the encyclopedia is the same as the contract price, there
could be no recovery in tort if the only actionable misrepresentation is
considered to be the statement that the supplements are sold at cost.
If the statement that the buyer will receive goods worth $989 is
held to be actionable, the buyer could recover the difference between the purchase price and $989 in a jurisdiction allowing benefit
of bargain damages.
As noted above, the rules concerning the scope of permissible
puffing are virtually identical in contract and tort.'40 However, the
buyer who seeks a tort remedy for misrepresentation must show that
he justifiably relied upon the misrepresentation. This sometimes
introduces a difficulty not present in the same degree where the buyer
seeks rescission, or damages for breach of warranty. Although a
representation concerning goods does not give rise to a warranty under the Uniform Commerical Code unless it becomes "part of the
basis of the bargain,"' 4' the official comments interpret this language
as not requiring any showing of reliance: "Rather, any fact which is
to take such affirmations, once made, out of the agreement, requires
clear affirmative proof."'' 4 2 As noted above, 43 rescission cannot be
obtained unless there is reliance on the misrepresentation, but if the
misrepresentation is fraudulent and made for the purpose of
influencing the buyer, the seller is usually not permitted to deny that
buyer's reliance was justifiable.144 On the other hand, in a tort action
the requirement of justifiable reliance sometimes will bar recovery if
the buyer was influenced by essentially irrelevant falsehoods (such as
the statement in case 5 that the encyclopedia buyer was "specially
selected"), or was negligent in failing to read the contract or in relying
PROSSER § 105, at 748.
See Bangert v. Emmco Ins. Co., 349 Il. App. 257, 110 N.E.2d 528 (1953).
'See PROSSER § 104; WILLISTON, SALES § 203.

"3
"3

141UCC

§ 2-313.

Id. § 2-313, Comment 3.
" See text supra accompanying notes 89-90.
" 3 WILLISTON, SALES § 627.
'41
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on promises which were negated in the written contract. 4 However,
most jurisdictions allow contributory negligence as a defense only if
the basis of buyer's claim is that the misrepresentation was made
negligently rather than fraudulently, 46 and in determining whether
the buyer's reliance was justifiable, courts usually consider the actual
capacity of the buyer rather than holding him to the standard
expected of the reasonably prudent man.'4 7 Where the seller is guilty
of intentional fraud, the anomaly of allowing buyer's negligence as a
defense is apparent.' 48 If buyer's negligence consists of failure to read
the contract or to insure that the written contract accurately reflects
the agreement, the result of disallowing the buyer's tort action on the
ground of negligence is usually to reimpose the parol evidence rule in
another guise.
B. Strict Liability
In situations where the gist of the buyer's complaint is that the
goods he received were defective, as was the furniture in case 3 above,
it is possible that the new products liability doctrine of strict liability
may provide a remedy. This doctrine has its principal application in
cases where defective products cause physical injury or property
damage to a user or consumer. 49 However, a few cases have also
applied the strict liability theory in situations where the buyer's
complaint was that he received defective goods which were worth less
than he paid for them.' The leading case of this kind is Santor v. A &
M Karagheusian,Inc.' In that case the buyer paid $14 per yard for
Grade #1 carpet. The carpet was defective and the buyer brought suit
against the manufacturer. (The dealer who had sold the carpet to the
buyer had gone out of business and moved out of the state.) The
Supreme Court of New Jersey held that the buyer could recover from
'41Danann

Realty Corp. v. Harris, 5 N.Y.2d 317, 157 N.E.2d 597, 184 N.Y.S.2d 599 (1959);
§ 103, at 731; RESTATEMENT OF TORTS §§ 537-38 (1938); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF
TORTS §§ 538, 540 (Tent. Draft No. 10, 1964).
'"RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §§ 545A, 552A (Tent. Draft No. 11, 1965).
'7Kraus v. National Bank of Commerce, 140 Minn. 108, 167 N.W. 353 (1913); PROSSER §
103, at 731-32; cf. RESTATEMENT OF TORTS §.538 (1938); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §
538 (Tent. Draft No. 10, 1964).
"' See Seavey, Caveat Emptor as of 1960, 38 TEXAS L. REV. 439, 446-49 (1960);
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 545A, Comment a (Tent. Draft No. 10, 1964).
"'See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A (Tent. Draft No. 10, 1964); Prosser, The
Fall of the Citadel (StrictLiability to the Consumer), 50 MINN. L. REV. 791 (1966).
11See Prosser, supra note 149, at 821-23.
1' 44 N.J. 52, 207 A.2d 305 (1965).
PROSSER
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the manufacturer the difference between the price paid for the carpet
and the actual market value of the defective carpeting at the time
when the buyer knew or should have known that it was defective. As is
usual in strict liability cases, recovery did not depend upon any
showing that the manufacturer was negligent or that it had made any
representations to the buyer concerning the quality of the carpet.
Liability was held to exist if "the article is defective, i.e., not
reasonably fit for the ordinary purposes for which such articles are
sold and used, and the defect arose out of the design or manufacture
or while the article was in the control of the manufacturer, and it
proximately causes injury or damage to the ultimate purchaser or
reasonably expected consumer ..

."I52

The decision in the Santor case has been criticized by leading
authorities and rejected by several courts." 3 The decision has also
found favor with some commentators.'54 The doctrine adopted in
Santor is not without difficulties, since determining liability involves
considering not only the quality of the goods purchased, but also the
purpose for which they were purchased and the price paid. For example, there would have been no liability in the Santor case if the
same carpet had been sold as low grade carpet for $3 per yard instead of being sold as grade #1 carpet for $14 per yard. Furthermore, the manufacturer would presumably not have been liable if it
had sold the carpet to the dealer as carpet of an inferior grade, even
though the dealer resold it as grade #1 carpet. Nevertheless, it
would be premature at this point to conclude the Santor decision is
erroneous. The decision may prove a needed adjunct to the arsenal
of consumer remedies, and some of the critics of the decision are
willing to concede that the decision was justified on the facts of the
case.'55 The approach taken in Santor may be useful in some jurisdictions as a means of circumventing rigid rules which unjustifiably
restrict the availability of a remedy for breach of warranty when
there is a warranty disclaimer clause.'56 Another virtue of the de2

Id. at 66-7, 207 A.2d at 313.

'"E.g., Seely v. White Motor Co., 63 Cal. 2d 9, 403 P.2d 145, 45 Cal. Rptr. 17 (1965); see
Prosser, supra note 149, at 821-23.
'4 See Donnelly, After the Fallof the Citadel:Exploitation of the Victory or Considerationof
All Interests, 19 SYRACuSE L. REv. 1 (1967).
"' Seely v. White Motor Co., 63 Cal. 2d 9, 17-8, 403 P.2d 145, 151, 45 Cal. Rptr. 17, 23
(1965).
"56Disclaimers have generally not been effective as defenses to claims based on strict liability
in tort. See Prosser, supra note 149, at 831-34.
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cision is that it permits recovery against a remote supplier who may
be actually responsible for the defective goods, but who may
not be liable for breach of contract for want of privity. The doctrine
of strict liability in tort usually is not restricted to claims against the
manufacturer, however, and could be invoked against the retail seller in an appropriate case.'57
As applied to case 3 above, it is likely that the furniture is defective
only as to the retail seller, who represented it to be of good quality. If
the manufacturer purported to supply the retailer with low grade
furniture, one could hardly hold the manufacturer liable on the theory
of Santor. The Santor doctrine is likely to be useful against the
manufacturer primarily in cases involving mechanical goods such as
washing machines, refrigerators, or automobiles which are sold new
and which turn out to be "lemons." In such cases the manufacturer
may or may not be liable on the basis of a standard written warranty
which the dealer is authorized to give to purchasers.
ESTOPPEL AND ILLEGAL BARGAIN

There are several other traditional legal theories which may
sometimes be helpful to consumers. The rules of estoppel may in some
circumstances prevent a seller from denying the truth of his
misrepresentation. 5 For example, in case 4 a court might hold that
because the buyer bought the sewing machine in reliance upon seller's
assertion that the machine could be returned within 30 days without
liability, the seller is estopped to deny the truth of the assertion by
showing that the terms of the written contract are otherwise."'
However, misrepresentations of this kind have traditionally been
remedied under the rules discussed above rather than under the law of
estoppel. Furthermore, estoppel will not be available if the buyer's
reliance is considered unreasonable.
If a buyer is sued upon a contract which has been obtained by
methods which are unlawful under the Federal Trade Commission
Act' 0 or under some state law, buyer's counsel should consider
defending on the ground that the contract is against public policy and
should not be enforced by the courts.' The consequence of holding
"Seeid. at 814-15 & n.126.
See PROSSER § 100, at 706-07.
"' Cf. Laverty v. Hawkeye Security Ins. Co., 258 Iowa 717, 140 N.W.2d 83 (1966).
"

15 U.S.C. § 45 (1964).
6A CORIN §§ 1374-75, 1529; 3 WILLISTON, SALES §§ 663-81; RESTATEMENT OF
CoNTriAcrs § 580 (1932).
6'See
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that an installment sales contract is unenforceable because it is
against public policy would often be very favorable to the buyer. In
such situations the guilty party will usually be unable either to enforce payment of the remaining installments or to recover the mer626
chandise. '
It has long been held that, in some circumstances, unethical
practices in the inducement of a contract will render the contract
unenforceable, even though the contract is itself a perfectly lezal
one.' 63 For example, a number of cases have held that a referral-sales
scheme involving misrepresentations similar to the ones in case 2
constitutes an illegal lottery and therefore any sales contract induced
by such methods is unenforceable.'" It would not be difficult for
courts to follow the same approach and refuse to enforce sales
contracts which are induced by violations of a statute forbidding
unfair or deceptive sales practices. It may be that the courts as
arbiters of "public policy" will someday decide that fraudulent and
deceptive sales practices constitute as great a danger to the morals and
fortunes of the foolish public as do raffles, lotteries, and gaming
contracts. However, in one case the argument was rejected that a
note given for the purchase of a used automobile could not be enforced
because the speedometer had been turned back in a manner prohibited
by statute.' 6 The court allowed the purchaser to recover damages for
deceit, but held that the speedometer statute was "intended to impose
upon the violator an additional penalty, not to enlarge the rights of
the other party to the contract."' 6 The fact that statutes such as the
Federal Trade Commission Act specify certain narrowly
circumscribed methods of enforcement might similarly be considered
to reflect a legislative intent not to create any additional private
rights.'67
63

WILLISTON, SALES

§§ 677, 678;

RESTATEMENT OF CONTRACTS

§ 598 (1932); see 6A

CORBIN §§ 1518, 1534, 1536, 1540.

"I E.g., Sirkin v. Fourteenth St. Store, 124 App. Div. 384, 108 N.Y.S. 830 (1908) (buyer's
agent received kickback for placing order); see 6A CORBIN § 1518.
I" E.g., State v. ITM, Inc., 52 Misc. 2d 39, 56-61, 275 N.Y.S.2d 303, 324-29 (Sup. Ct. 1966);
Sherwood & Roberts-Yakima, Inc. v. Leach, 67 Wash. 2d 630,409 P.2d 160 (1965).

,65Chapman v.Zakzaska, 273 Wis. 64, 76 N.W.2d 537 (1956).
16

Id. at 68,76 N.W.2d at 539.

167Cf. Kelly v. Kosuga, 358 U.S. 516 (1959). The mere fact that violations of the Federal

Trade Commission Act are not grounds for a private action under sections 4 or 16 of the Clayton Act does not foreclose the argument that contracts obtained by violations of the Federal
Trade Commission Act should not be judicially enforced. See Clayton Act §§ 1, 4, 16, 15
U.S.C. §§ 12, 15,26(1964).
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UNCONSCIONABILITY

Section 2-302 of the Uniform Commercial Code provides that if a
court "finds the contract or any clause of the contract to have been
unconscionable at the time it was made the court may refuse to
enforce the contract, or it may enforce the remainder of the contract
without the unconscionable clause, or it may so limit the application
of any unconscionable clause as to avoid any unconscionable result."
This section has been widely discussed and sometimes warmly
criticized. 6 ' The argument has been made, based on the official
comments to section 2-302 and on the drafting history of the section,
that the section was designed not as a weapon against deceptive sales
tactics, but as a means of remedying one-sided clauses in form
contracts prepared solely by one party.' 69 The better view is that the
section encompasses both goals. The closest analogy to section 2-302
under pre-Code law is the equitable power of the courts to refuse to
grant specific enforcement of unconscionable contracts, and this
analogous equity doctrine is frequently invoked in cases of fraud and
misrepresentation.' 70 The language of the statute is broad enough to
permit its use in cases of this kind and the history of section 2-302 in
the state legislatures specifically invokes the equity precedents as a
guide to interpretation of the section. The original comments to
section 2-302 stated that the section would "apply to the field of
.6 See, e.g., Davenport, Unconscionabilityand the Uniform Commercial Code, 22 U. MIAMI
L. REV. 121 (1967); Leff, Unconscionabilityand the Code-The Emperor's New Clause, 115 U.
PA. L. REV. 485 (1967); Note, 45 IOWA L. REV. 843 (1960); Note, 109 U. PA. L. REV. 401
(1961); Note, 45 VA. L. REV. 583 (1959); Note, 63 YALE L.J. 560 (1954).
36' See Leff, supra note 168.
'See 5A CORBIN §§ 1164-68; H. MCCLINTOCK, EQUITy §§ 69-72 (2d ed. 1948); J.
POMEROY, SPECIFIC PERFORMANCE OF CONTRACTS §§ 40-43, 175-97, 209-87 (3d ed. 1926); 5
WILLISTON, CONTRACTS § 1425. It has recently been argued that the equity rules concerning
unconscionability are not relevant to the concept of unconscionability in the Uniform
Commercial Code. Leff, supra note 168, at 528-41 (1967). The reasons given to indicate the
irrelevance of the equity precedents are that the deceptive and misleading bargaining practices found in the equity cases rarely occur today, that land transactions are likely to involve
more money and be of greater importance to the parties than are chattel transactions, and
that land is the "only thing that relatively unsophisticated people have which is worth tricking
them out of." The first and last points are naive and completely unsupported by any evidence.
Quite opposite conclusions have been reached by those who attempted to obtain evidence.
E.g., CAPLOVITZ at 1248, 81-93, 137-54; REPORT OF THE NATIONAL ADVISORY COMMISSION
ON CIVIL DISORDERS at 139-40. With respect to the greater importance of land transactions,
if one grants the relevance of the observation at all, one can only note that the equity doctrine was never restricted to real property and that the purchase of an automobile or heavy appliance is often of greater economic impact to low income buyers than the execution of a lease.
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Sales the equity courts' ancient policy of policing contracts for
unconscionability or unreasonableness."' 7 ' Although this comment
was not retained in the final draft, the legislative studies of the Code in
many states reveal that the legislatures intended section 2-302 to
"carry equity practice into the sales field.' ' 72
The equitable rule that specific performance will be denied in cases
where the contract sought to be enforced is unconscionable has been
stated as follows:
[S]pecific performance of a contract will be refused when the plaintiff
has obtained the agreement by sharp and unscrupulous practices, by
overreaching, by concealment of important facts, by trickery, by
taking undue advantage of his position, or by any other means which
are unconscientious; and when the contract itself is unfair, one-sided,
unconscionable, or affected by any other such inequitable feature, and
where the specific enforcement would be oppressive or harsh upon the
defendant, or would prevent the enjoyment of his own rights, or would
in any other manner work injustice.' 73
As is apparent from the above statement, the equitable doctrine is
extremely broad and is applied in a great variety of factual situations.
The doctrine encompasses such legal defenses as fraud, mistake,
duress, or illegality, but also goes much further and provides a
defense to a suit for specific performance in cases where the
unconscionable features would not give rise to a defense at law.' 74
Among other situations, the doctrine is applied in cases where 'the
contract is fair on its face, but one party has been tricked or deceived
"'

"

UCC § 2-302, Comment I (May, 1949 draft).

E.g., ILLINOIS COMMISSION FOR THE UNIFORMITY OF LEGISLATION, ILLINOIS

ANNOTATIONS TO THE UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE

TO THE PROPOSED UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE
CODE STUDY COMMISSION,

49 (1960);

31 (1953);

MASSACHUSETTS ANNOTATIONS

NEW JERSEY UNIFORM COMMERCIAL

SECOND REPORT TO THE GOVERNOR, THE SENATE AND THE

ASSEMBLY OF THE STATE OF NEW JERSEY

52 (1960); OHIO

OHIO ANNOTATIONS TO THE UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE

LEGISLATIVE SERVICE COMMISSION,

17 (1960);

PENNSYLVANIA

GENERAL

ASSEMBLY JOINT STATE COMMISSION, PENNSYLVANIA ANNOTATIONS TO THE PROPOSED
UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE 18 (1953). Similar comments in other state studies are cited in

Left, supra note 168, at 528

n. 166.

171J. POMEROY, SPECIFIC PERFORMANCE

17,5A

CORBIN

§§ 1164, 1167; J.

§ 40, at 121 (3d ed. 1926).

POMEROY, SPECIFIC PERFORMANCE

§ 40 (3d ed. 1926); 5

§ 1425; Annot., 87 A.L.R. 1345 (1933). The difference between the
legal and equitable defense is illustrated by cases such as Panco v. Rogers, 19 N.J. Super. 12, 87
A.2d 770 (Ch. 1952), where plaintiff sued for rescission of the contract and defendant counterclaimed for specific performance. The court found no sufficient legal basis for rescission of the
contract, but refused to order specific performance because it would be harsh and oppressive.
WILLISTON, CONTRACTS
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in the bargaining process, 75 as well as in cases where one or more
terms of the contract are intrinsically unfair.'7 6 Although most cases
to date involving section 2-302 have focused principally on the
intrinsic unfairness of certain contract terms or of the exchange being
made,"' the section should also find use in cases where the unfairness
is principally or exclusively in the deceptive practices which induced
the buyer to sign the contract. One decision has already emphasized
this aspect of unconscionability.7"
The equity cases were easily broad enough to justify denial of
specific performance in each of the cases outlined at the beginning of
this article. The equitable doctrine of unconscionability did have one
dramatic limitation, however-it applied only in cases where 'the
remedy sought was specific performance. The result of refusing to
grant specific performance of a contract of sale was nearly always to
leave the parties where they were before contracting-the buyer kept
his money and the seller kept his land or goods. In the unusual
situation where this would not be the result, courts would sometimes
refuse to consider the argument that specific performance should be
denied because of unconscionability . 79 On the other hand, where the
contract sought to be enforced was a contract to make a bequest by
will, specific performance would often be denied even though the
plaintiff had fully performed services which constituted the agreed
consideration.' 8 There are also a few cases, of an extreme nature,
where considerations of unconscionability prompted the courts to
deny a remedy other than specific performance.'
Section 2-302 cannot be restricted to cases of specific
performance, since to do so would not effect any change in the law,
and the section would be mere surplusage. Furthermore, section 2-302
'"E.g., Barnett v. Cloyd's Ex'rs., 125 Va. 546, 557, 100 S.E. 674, 678 (1919).
"'

E.g., Campbell Soup Co. v. Wentz, 172 F.2d 80 (3d Cir. 1948).

'American Home Improvement, Inc. v. Maclver, 105 N.H. 435, 201 A.2d 886 (1964);
Frostifresh Corp. v. Reynoso, 52 Misc. 2d 26, 274 N.Y.S.2d 757 (Sup. Ct. 1966), rev'd in part,
54 Misc. 2d 119, 281 N.Y.S.2d 964 (App. T. 1967); Sinkoff Beverage Co. v. Joseph Schlitz
Brewing Co., 51 Misc. 2d 446, 273 N.Y.S.2d 364 (Sup. Ct. 1966); Paragon Homes v. Crace, 4
UCC REP. SERV. 19 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1967); Paragon Homes v. Langlois, 4 UCC REP. SERV.
16 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1967); see Williams v. Walker-Thomas Furniture Co., 350 F.2d 445 (D.C.
Cir. 1965).
"'Statev. ITM, Inc., 52 Misc. 2d 39, 275 N.Y.S.2d 303, 320-22 (Sup. Ct. 1966).
'"Indianapolis N. Traction Co. v. Essington, 54 Ind. App. 286,99 N.E. 757 (1912).
11 E.g., Neary v. Markham, 155 F.2d 485 (10th Cir. 1946).
"'

See Hume v. United States, 132 U.S. 406 (1889); James v. Morgan, I Lev. 111, 83 Eng.

Rep. 323 (K.B. 1663). These cases are discussed in Davenport, supra note 168, at 121.
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covers cases of non-enforcement or limitation of particular
unconscionable clauses as well as non-enforcement of the entire
contract. Where non-enforcement of the entire contract is at issue,
however, the most conservative interpretation of section 2-302 would
be to restrict it to cases where the contract is still wholly executory
and one party seeks damages for the other party's failure to perform.
In the sales context, this situation provides the legal counterpart of the
equitable action for specific performance, since the non-defaulting
party would ordinarily seek damages if this would provide a
satisfactory remedy, or specific enforcement if damages would be an
inadequate or impracticable remedy. If section 2-302 were limited in
its application to cases of executory contracts, the section would be of
limited assistance to low income consumers in cases involving
installment sales contracts, since such buyers frequently do not object
before receipt of the goods. There is no particular reason to limit
section 2-302 in this manner, however, since the limitation in equity
arose from the nature of the remedy sought rather than from any
compelling considerations of policy. Although it may be unfair in
some cases to apply section 2-302 where one party has fully performed, the determination of such cases can be safely left to the
courts, which have the discretion to apply section 2-302 only in
cases where it would be fair to do so on the basis of all the facts. The
cases already decided under section 2-302 indicate that the section will not be restricted to situations involving executory contracts,
regardless of whether the unconscionability relates to the means of
' Several recent
obtaining the contract or to some specific clause. 82
cases illustrate the problems involved in applying section 2-302 in
situations where a contract has been fully performed on one side.
In State v. ITM'83 the Attorney General of New York sought to
enjoin defendants from operating a referral-sales scheme which
involved a number of fraudulent and misleading sales practices. This
case was quite similar to case 2 in that the consumers were told that
they would never have to pay for goods out of their own pockets
because the goods purchased would be paid for from commissions
earned by referrals. As in case 3, the ITM case also involved the sale
"2Williams

v. Walker-Thomas Furniture Co., 350 F.2d 445 (D.C. Cir. 1965); State v. ITM,

Inc., 52 Misc. 2d 39, 275 N.Y.S.2d 303 (Sup. Ct. 1966); Frostifresh Corp, v. Reynoso, 52 Misc.
2d 26, 274 N.Y.S.2d 757 (Sup. Ct. 1966), rev'd irpart, 54 Misc. 2d 119, 281 N.Y.S.2d 964

(App. T. 1967).

1 52 Misc. 2d 39,275 N.Y.S.2d 303 (Sup. Ct. 1966).
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of goods at prices much higher than the normal retail prices. The
court granted the relief requested by the Attorney General, but also
found that the installment contracts which consumers had been
induced to sign by defendants were unconscionable, and were
therefore unenforceable.' 84 Frostifresh Corp. v. Reynoso'8 5 also
involved facts similar to those in case 2. Plaintiff brought suit for
$1364 which was alleged to be owed by defendants as a result of the
86
purchase from plaintiff of a combination refrigerator-freezer.'
The cost of the appliance to plaintiff was $348. The defendants had
been told by plaintiff's agent, who negotiated the contract in Spanish,
that they would really get the appliance for nothing because they
would earn commissions from sales to neighbors and friends. The
written contract, in English, was not translated or explained to the
defendants. The trial judge held that the price and credit provisions of
the contract were unconscionable and therefore would not be enforced
under section 2-302. However, the court said, "since the defendants
have not returned the refrigerator-freezer, they will be required to
reimburse the plaintiff for the cost to the plaintiff, namely $348.00."'I 7
On appeal, the appellate division of the Supreme Court affirmed the
finding of unconscionability, but held that the seller was entitled to
recover not only the $348 cost, but also "a reasonable profit, in
addition to trucking and service charges necessarily incurred and
reasonable finance charges." '88
It is instructive to compare the result in ITM with that in
Froslifresh. Both cases involved goods which were sold for excessively
high prices, and both also involved misleading and deceptive
statements which induced the buyer to sign the sales contracts. In
ITM the court focused its discussion of unconscionability around the
misleading and deceptive practices, and enjoined the defendant from
enforcing contracts induced by such practices. In other words, the
court treated the case as one involving unconscionability of the
contract as a whole, which made it unenforceable. On the other hand,
"
S

Id. at 62, 275 N.Y.S.2d at 321-22, 329.
52 Misc. 2d 26, 274 N.Y.S.2d 757 (Sup. Ct. 1966), rev'd in part, 54 Misc. 2d 119, 281

N.Y.S.2d 964 (App. T. 1967).
"' The sale price was $900, to which had been added a credit charge of $245.88, a late charge

of $22.87, and attorney's fees of $277.35, for a total of$1396. 10, less $32.00 paid, which reduced
the claim to $1364.10.
"' 52 Misc. 2d at 28, 274 N.Y.S.2d at 760.
"'54 Misc. 2d at 120,281 N.Y.S.2d at 965.
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the court in Frostifresh focused its opinion on the excessive price
charged, treating the case as one involving an unconscionable price
clause, and held that the price and credit clauses of the contract were
unenforceable. The result was not to completely bar enforcement of
the contract, but to read in a "reasonable price" in place of the
unconscionable price clause which was stricken from the contract.
Thus the fact that the remedies in the two cases are quite different does
not mean that the cases are inconsistent. However, one may question
whether the approach taken by the appellate division in the
Frostifresh case provided a sufficient antidote to all the
unconscionable features involved in that case. The buyer was left with
the obligation to pay for an appliance he was tricked into buying and
the seller was allowed to recover a "reasonable profit" from his
trickery. The remedy allowed in Frostifresh would be more
appropriat& in a case where the only unconscionable feature of the
transaction was the price, as in American Home Improvement
Co. v. Maclver.89
The approach taken by the court in Frostifresh would leave the
buyer without any remedy under section 2-302 in cases where a sale
is induced by unconscionable means but the sales price is not excessive. As noted above, the tort remedy for fraud is similarly limited
due to the necessity of computing damages. There is no need for such
a limitation on section 2-302 where sales at the standard price result
from the seller's fraud. In such cases, the seller should not be allowed to recover any profit, whether reasonable or unreasonable. Cases
of this kind were within the scope of the equity doctrine of unconscionability, which did not require a showing of damage as a condition of invoking the doctrine. 9 ' There will, however, be a question
as to what constitutes a proper remedy under section 2-302 in cases
like 1, 2 or 5, particularly if the value of the goods sold is not disproportionate to the purchase price. Section 2-302 says the court may
refuse to enforce the contract. This could mean that the contract is
void, so that the seller can replevy the goods sold and buyer can recover his payments, or that, as is usual in cases of illegal bargains,
the parties will be left as the court finds them-the buyer keeping the
goods and the seller keeping the payments made prior to the decision. Section 2-302 should be interpreted to give the courts flexibility
129105 N.H. 435, 201 A.2d 886 (1964).
11 Kelly v. Central Pac. R.R. 74 Cal. 557, 561, 16 P. 386, 388 (1888).
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in dealing with unconscionable clauses and contracts, so that courts
could properly take either of the above approaches in a given case,
as well as the approach followed in Frostiresh.The equitable powers
of the courts are easily broad enough to permit this, since the court
can write a decree refusing absolutely to enforce the contract, or refusing to enforce it on the condition that the goods be returned to the
seller or on any other conditions which are considered appropriate.' 9'
The contours of section 2-302 remain to be developed in
subsequent opinions, but the section should prove to be extremely
useful in dealing with misrepresentations by sellers. The section will
nearly always foreclose the seller from obtaining summary judgment,
or judgment on the pleadings, because the buyer must be allowed an
opportunity to present evidence of unconscionability.1 9. The equitable
background of the notion of unconscionability reflects a particular
concern with protecting the ignorant and credulous from those who
would exploit them, and the same concern is already apparent in the
decisions invoking section 2-302. The defense of unconscionability is
not hemmed about with the technical restrictions which have grown
up around the older legal remedies, and which are often unrealistic
when applied to high pressure, form-contract merchandising aimed at
unsophisticated buyers. Rather than struggling with the intricacies of
the parol evidence rule, courts will be free to consider whether or not
the evidence of fraud is persuasive on the basis of all the facts,
including the recitals of any written instrument. Factors which may
constitute technical defenses at law, such as those discussed in earlier
sections of this article, can be considered in each case as factors which
may make it inequitable to invoke section 2-302, but not as hard and
fast rules. Antiquated assumptions concerning the duties and
capabilities of the hypothetical reasonably prudent man may be
discarded where they are inappropriate. For example, the decisions in
a particular jurisdiction may indicate that the misleading statements
in the referral-sales scheme (case 2) are within the bounds of
permissible puffing, or that the buyer may not rescind because of his
use of the goods. Under section 2-302, the court would wish to
consider such facts, but might well conclude that the buyer was
See Neary v. Markham, 155 F.2d 485 (10th Cir. 1946).

'9'

Central Budget Corp. v. Sanchez, 53 Misc. 2d 620, 279 N.Y.S.2d 391 (N.Y. City Civ. Ct.

292

1967); Sinkoff Beverage Co. v. Joseph Schlitz Brewing Co., 51 Misc. 2d 446, 273 N.Y.S.2d 364
(Sup. Ct. 1966).
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nevertheless deliberately exploited by the seller and that it is
more equitable to refuse to enforce the contract, even with some loss
to the seller, than to hold the buyer to the contract and reward the
seller. Section 2-302 provides the courts with an opportunity to develop a body of a law in light of contemporary needs and problems
and to redress the balance of power where it has tilted too far in the
favor of sellers.
CONCLUSION

The above survey indicates that there is no lack of legal theories
for dealing with fraud and misrepresentation on the part of sellers, but
that some of the restrictions on remedies are unrealistic when applied
to unsophisticated consumers. Many of the difficulties which may
frustrate legal redress are being slowly dissolved by the continuing
development of the common law. Section 2-302 of the Uniform
Commercial Code is a promising addition to the common law remedies and should prove most helpful in jurisdictions where the common
law is at present inhospitable to consumers. The situation is not hopeless for the buyer who believes he has been tricked or cheated and who
has signed what purports to be an ironclad contract, even if he does
not seek legal advice until some time after he has received the goods.
The common law seems to be making an effort to accommodate itself
to new times and new problems, and it is to be hoped that with occasional statutory assistance it will succeed.

